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CHAPTERl 
INTRODUCTION 
Europe has undergone a financial revolution. Within the past decade, a great 
amount of change has taken place for many European countries. Integration has been at 
the forefront of the various issues these countries have had to face recently. Monetary 
and economic integration has had a meaningful impact on the overall character of each 
country. Prior to complete integration and the introduction of a single currency, the Euro, 
each country acted in a supremely independent way. However, since the advent of the 
Euro, each country has and will be forever changed. With the identity of each country 
and culture in the Euro countries remaining very vigorous, the financial and economic 
situation for each country has changed dramatically with increased reliance and 
dependence on each other. All the Euro countries are now bounded together in a very 
material way, with the actions by one country impacting the others. The Euro drastically 
influenced, forever, the way business is conducted in Europe. However, witli the 
introduction of the Euro, it is unclear as to the impact the Euro would have on the various 
financial markets in which it is incorporated including the stock, bond, and interest rate 
markets. 
In this paper, I pose and attempt to answer two questions: 
1. Has the introduction of the Euro changed volatility in the stock, bond and 
interest rate markets? 
2. Which countries benefited the most from the Euro and Why? 
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My hypotheses are: 
1. The Euro has reduced volatility in all these markets: stock, bond and interest rate 
in all countries with the introduction of the Euro. 
2. The European countries who are members of the European Union and those who 
engage in more i ntemational capital and trade flows benefited more than those 
countries that do not 
I begin by tracing the highlights in the history of the European economic system 
prior to the Euro and discuss events that ultimately led to the introduction of the Euro. 
Especially important events are discussed in Chapter 2, which is accompanied by Figure 
2.1, a chronology of major developments, and Table 2.1, a table of various groupings of 
European countries. These tables and chronology list significant events throughout the 
history of the Euro. Section 2.1 discusses the early years, prior to the Euro launch, when 
the idea of integration was established between the European countries and a vision was 
set for complete future integration. Section 2 .2, "The European Monetary System" is 
explained in this section. The EMS was very critical to the beginning stages of economic 
integration. In this section, the HECU" or European Currency Unit is explained as it was 
a very important precursor tot he E uro. Section 2 .3, the influence and impact 0 f The 
Single European Act of 1986 is discussed as well as important explanation and discussion 
of the European regulatory bodies including the European Parliament and the European 
Council as well as the effects of their actions on the introduction of the Euro. Section 2.4 
highlights the stages of admission to the European Monetary Union as established by the 
Maastricht Treaty. These stages are explained more in depth as well as crucial data that 
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pertain to the admission of certain countries into the Monetary Union. Section 2.5 
highlights the launch of the Euro and the events surrounding its beginning. This section 
begins in 1999, when the Euro was launched as a unit of account for transactions. The 
last section in this chapter focuses on the future further financial integration in Europe. 
This section includes future plans for Europe as well as various viewpoints and 
perspectives on the current state of the Euro. 
The topic of economic and financial integration is discussed throughout Chapter 
3. Economic integration, as a broad and general concept is discussed in the first section, 
section 3.l. To understand integration within Europe, one must first understand the 
/ 
overall concept of economic integration, which is what I explain in this section. 
Section 3.2 comprises a discussion on the theory behind common currency, as a part of 
economic integration, and, reasons as to why a country would want to adopt a common 
currency. This discussion is very important to lead up to the last section in Chapter 3, 
Financial Integration, which is where "Financial Market Integration" is defined and 
various theories and evidence are presented on the impacts of market integration. 
Both of these chapters lead to the final analysis, which is explained and discussed 
in Chapter 4- Empirical Analysis. All data, methodology, regression analysis, results and 
conclusions to the two posed questions are illustrated in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE HISTORY OF THE EURO 
A monumental event took place on January 1, 2002 for 12 European nations and 
for the entirety of Europe. A single currency was launched which would be the cause of 
the elimination of 12 national currencies forever. Yet, while January 1, 2002 was the 
climatic point with the introduction of a brand new currency, it did not happen overnight. 
Many events took place t9 reach the culmination that occurred on January 1. While some 
events were very critical to the development of the Euro, others did not make as much of 
an impact. In this chapter, I will outline the history behind the Euro and the events that 
led up to its final introduction on January 1, 2002. (Figure 2.1, Table 2.1) 
Section 2.1 The Early Years 
The Euro began with the Summit Meeting at The Hague in December 1969. This 
conference was a meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the countries of the 
European Economic Community during December 1969. During this meeting, it was 
agreed upon that there was a need to have the community be transformed into an 
"economic and monetary union." Also, it was decided to open negotiations on the 
enlargement of the community and to reach agreement on the system of community 
finances. The Luxembourg Prime Minister, Pierre Werner, was appointed to report on 
how to reduce the exchange volatility between countries, which led him to the writing of 
the Werner Report. The Werner Report was published n early a year later in October 
1970. This report was critical to the development of the euro as this report called for the 
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centralization of the macroeconomic policies of the members of the European Economic 
Community. While the Wemer Report was not a direct recommendation for a single 
currency or a "European Centralized Bank" which would soon follow, the Report was the 
first publication of the perspective that more centralization between the EEC's member 
states was a necessity for future financial growth and development of the European 
Community. 
Towards the end of March 1971, another meeting between the European Council 
and the Heads of State and Government of the member states took place which proved 
significant. At this meeting, the member states committed to each other to harmonize 
i 
their budgetary policies and reduce the margins of fluctuation between their currencies. 
This event was significant since it represented the first true commitment to the vision of 
future centralization and integration for Europe as well as a commitment to cooperation 
between European member states. 
During the years of 1971 and 1972, more summit meetings and council meetings 
between the Heads of State of the member states took place. On April 3, 1973, the 
European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) was established. This fund was created 
by various members of the European Union who would deposit reserves to provide a pool 
of resources to stabilize exchange rates and finance balance of payments. In exchange 
for depositing 20% of their reserves, member states would have access to a wide variety 
of credit opportunities denominated in the European Currency Unit (ECU). This event 
was critical because each of the member states was now relying on each other in financial 
situations. Each s tate must cooperate together and pool their resources in 0 rder for a 
stabilization of exchange rates and streams of money. If one of the states decided not to 
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cooperate, that would have an impact on the rest and would not help to further the 
process of integration. This total commitment and cooperation was vital and ultimately 
realized by each member state. 
Section 2.2 The European Monetary System 
The European Monetary Cooperation Fund became the driving force behind much 
of the work and progress towards the advent of the Euro. In July 1978, the European 
Monetary Council met in Bremen. This Bremen European C ouneil produced several 
specific proposals and policy guidelines which included the French-German proposal to 
launch the European Monetary System (EMS) and a European "concentrated action" 
package calling for the co'ordination of macroeconomic policies. 
The creation 0 f the European Monetary System began in t he year 1 978 with a 
meeting between the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and French president Valery 
Giscard d'Estaing. Both government leaders discovered that they shared similar feelings 
surrounding the "disorder" of monetary issues after the end of the Bretton Woods system, 
as well as, the inability of the European member states to sustain the "Snake" monetary 
arrangement, whereby those countries had agreed to limit the volatility in their bilateral 
exchange rates and reduce exchange exposure in and among each other. More 
specifically, the "Snake" was an exchange rate system created in 1972 to restrict the 
fluctuation of currencies between -2.25% and 2.25%. Participating countries were 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Netherlands, Germany, and Italy. Schmidt and 
Giscard d'Estang viewed this as a serious issue for the EU states as they saw dramatic 
exchange rate movements as a threat to the Common Market and decided that action 
needed to be taken. Not surprisingly, neither country, Germany nor France were willing 
9 
to risk a weakening of their home currencies in any arrangement created to solve the 
Issue. Therefore, they decided upon the European Monetary System of which all 
European Community states were members as well as the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
being instituted as the scheme of monetary stabilization. 
Just under a year later in 1979, the EMS came into force. The European 
Monetary System was created by many 0 f t he nations 0 f the European Union. These 
nations were Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands. In effect, the European Monetary System was created to establish a stable 
exchange rate mechanism and prevent large fluctuations in member currencies relative to 
i 
each other, as well as, counter inflation. This unification between the majority of the 
countries of the European Union represented a grand step towards the achievement of the 
centralization of Europe and especially its financial and economic integration. Each 
country united with each other to work for the improvement of its own country as well as 
its neighbors. 
As a part of the newly created European Monetary System, the European 
Currency Unit, also known as the "ECU" came to serve as the accounting unit for the 
European Union member states. The ECU was essentially an artificial "basket" currency. 
The ECU was conceived on March 13, 1979 by the EEC, the European Economic 
Community. and was the precursor to the euro, introduced in 1999. The ECU proved 
critical to the overall success of the European Monetary System. Technically speaking, 
the EMS was a limited- flexible exchange rate system that defined bands in which the 
bilateral exchange rates of the member countries could fluctuate. A parity grid was 
created which defined the width of permissible fluctuation. Typically, the bandwidths 
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were 2.25% to each side. The borders of the bands were called the "upper intervention 
point" and "lower intervention point." The parity grid defined the parities for all 
combinations of the ECU currencies. 
Section 2.3 The Single European Act of 1986 
In light of the launch of the European Monetary System and the precursor to the 
euro, a realization was made concerning the overall market situation between the EU 
member countries. In February 1986, the Single European Act was signed by all l2 
member states in which each agreed to set-up a single market throughout the European 
Union by 1992. This would entail a breakdown of restrictions and regulations placed on 
,; 
the exchange of capital flows, goods, and services which had been in effect for many 
years previous. In addition, the Single European Act stated that the Commission, a body 
of the European Parliament consisting of 20 Commissioners, monitor competition to 
ensure no enterprise act in such a way to restrict free movement of goods and services 
between the countries and within the Community or exploit a dominant market position 
within the Community. 
The European Parliament was established in September 1976, as a regulatory 
body for the European Union. The European Parliament played an important role in the 
creation and development of the Euro. In a legislative sense, the Parliament took a vote 
on which countries qualified for membership of the Single Currency and also established 
rules and regulations for the operation of the European Central Bank. The Parliament 
also proposed various amendments to the legislation of the proposed single currency and 
voted on directives that protected the consumers and users of the new national currency. 
This created a free system of transfer between the countries and facilitated more 
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centralization and unification of Europe. The Single European Act strengthened the 
powers of the European Parliament, by creating new responsibilities including a new 
legislative process with a new procedure for cooperation between the Parliament and the 
Council. 
The European Council is the body of heads of state or government of the member 
states of the European Union. This council gave Parliament new power and an equal 
base of power with which to be a co-legislator. The Single European Act was a very 
critical point for the European Community states in the sense that each country would be 
working together towards the stabilization and growth of the countries instead of simply 
" focusing internally and concentrating on the betterment of just their home base. 
With this Act, each country was reaching out to each other's market in the hopes of 
bettering not only their own economy but the economies of their neighbors and the entire 
European Economic Community. Each state realized that they must cooperate and 
collaborate together to ultimately realize their vision. In reflecting on what this Act states, 
the most significant section is that of no country dominating or exploiting their position 
within the Community. Specifically stated in the text of the Single European Act, 
HAW ARE of the responsibility incumbent upon Europe to aim at speaking ever 
increasingly with one voice and to act with consistency and solidarity in order more 
effectively to protect its common interests and independence, in particular to display the 
principles of democracy and compliance with the law ... " "D etermined to improve the 
economic and social situation by extending common policies and pursuing new 
objectives, and to ensure a smoother functioning of the Communities by enabling the 
institutions to exercise their powers under conditions most in keeping with Community 
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interests."! This is most significant since without this, the entire process and purpose of 
the creation of a financially unified Europe would be pointless. Without a solid 
commitment of every state working towards the whole, the entire solidification of Europe 
would eventually never happen .. 
Section 2.4 The Maastricht Treaty 
With the beginning steps towards the unification of Europe and the acts calling 
for the EU states' commitment in place, the next step was to decide upon concrete stages 
for the development of the European Monetary Union. 
A committee was mandated which was presided over by the President of the 
,( 
European Commission, Jacques Delors, to study and propose these specific stages. 
Others involved in the committee and formation of the stages included, Alexandre 
Lamfalussy, General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements, Niels Thygesen, 
Professor of Economics, Copenhagen, and Miguel Boyer, President of the Banco Exterior 
De Espana. What resulted from their meeting was known as the "Delors Report," which 
outlaid three stages. 
The first stage was set to begin on July 1, 1990. Stage One of the Economic and 
Monetary Union mainly constituted the setting of a reorganization and redirection in 
responsibilities for the various committees, governors, and member states, including 
creation of committees to delegate and complete the work of the three stages of the EMU. 
July 1 marked the date of the abolishment of restrictions on the movement of capital 
between member states. At this time, the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks 
and the member states of the EEC began to realize more responsibilities within the 
I Single European Act. EUROPA. Retrieved Dec. 11, 2002 from the World Wide Web: 
http://europa.eu.intiabc!obj/treaties/enlentr14a.htm 
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monetary system. 
In Stage One, a revision to the Treaty of Rome, which established the European 
Economic Community, was required to create the institutional structure. Upon the 
revision, a governmental conference was convened and after much negotiation 
surrounding the treaty, the Maastricht treaty was established and agreed upon. The 
Maastricht Treaty was eventually signed by the 12 member states of the EU, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, 
Spain, and Portugal. However, this treaty didn't easily come into force as several 
countries declared referendum against it. In 1 992, Denmark rejected the treaty as the 
country believed it wouI(~ jeopardize the national identity of Denmark. However, after 
some alterations, Denmark ratified it. In mid-1992, France's national referendum barely 
approved the treaty by a margin of 51.05% to 48.95%. In July 1993, Britain's Parliament 
ratified the treaty despite a court challenge regarding the believ·ed illegal power over 
policies transfer to the EU, after the treaty is approved. Through all these referendums, 
the Maastricht Treaty was finally approved and the process could continue towards 
complete unification. 
This treaty proved crucial as it determined the criteria for member states to 
progress into the second and third stages of the EMU and to ultimately adopt the euro 
currency. Criterion one was price stability, in which the rate of inflation could not 
exceed the average rates of inflation of the three member states with the lowest inflation 
rates by more the 1.5%. Criterion two concerned interest rates, in which the Maastricht 
treaty stated that the long- term interest rates could not vary by more than 2% in relation 
to the average interest rates of the three member states with the lowest interest rates. In 
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regards to deficits, national budget deficits for the member states must be close to or 
below 3% of the gross national product. Also, public debt could not exceed 60% of the 
gross national product. The third, and most important criterion, exchange rate stability, 
was also addressed in that a national currency could not be devalued during the two 
previous years and would have to remain within the EMS 2.25% margin of fluctuation. 
These criteria proved to be rather stringent; however, this stringency was the key to a 
successful European Economic and Monetary Union. A common and stable ground with 
which each member states' economy converging was essential for the continuation and 
success of a monetarily single Europe . 
.. 
Upon the passage of the Maastricht treaty that outlined the restrictions placed 
upon the member states and signaled the level of expectations the national governments 
and councils had for the Economic and Monetary System, the next stage could begin. 
Stage Two of the EMU began on January 1, 1994 with the establishment of the 
European Monetary Institute (EMI).2 The European Monetary Institute essentially 
replaced the previous Committees of Governors and the various subcommittees and 
working groups created to complete the progress towards the monetary union. The 
European Monetary Institute possessed several responsibilities towards the creation of the 
Economic and Monetary Union. 
As stated in the Maastricht Treaty, the objective of the European Monetary 
Institute was the "realization of the conditions necessary for the transition to the third 
stage," and its tasks involved, "strengthening the co-ordination of monetary policies" and 
"making the preparations required for. .. a single monetary policy and .... a single 
2 Constitution of the ESCB. ECB. Retrieved Nov. 2, 2002 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.ecb.intiaboutiemu.htm 
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currency.,,3 
The duties of the EMI in the overall creation of the European Monetary Union can 
be grouped into a few different areas. One area focused on co-ordination and co-
operation between the central banks of the member states as well as co-ordination of the 
monetary and exchange rate policies among the banks. Another area concerned the 
realization and design of the infrastructure, procedures, and policies necessary for the 
progression and success of Stage Three, in which a common currency and exchange rate 
policies would be established and functioning. The EMI also served as the advisory 
board on various economic and financial issues along with the governments and 
. . .. .t 
commumty mstltutlOns. " 
The European Monetary Institute held an important position in the EMU in that 
the EMI provided the platform in which the co-ordination and co-operation in many 
different aspects for the European member states could take place. Without such a 
centralized institutional structure created like that of the Economic Monetary Institute, 
with its own powers and resources to devote to the vision of the European Monetary 
Union, total convergence of the members' economies and national banks could not have 
been realized.44 
While the EMI was enabling the unification between the European member states, 
a very important event in December 1995 took place. At the Madrid European Council 
meeting, the European Council discussed and agreed to the name of the common 
currency unit which was to be introduced at the beginning of Stage Three of the EMU, 
3 Maastricht Treaty. BBC: NEWS. Retrieved Nov. 5, 2002 from the World Wide Web: 
http://news.bbc.co.ukJlIhilin depthleurope/euro-glossaryl1216944.stm 
4 The European Monetary Institute: tasks and organization. ECU-activities. Retrieved on Nov. 13, 2002 
from World Wide Web: http://www.ecu-activities.beIl994_2/carcascio.htrnl 
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the "euro." Also at this meeting of the heads of state, the EMI was given additional 
responsibilities surrounding the preparatory work for the introduction of the single 
currency, including that 0 f the strategy, rules, a nd operational procedures relating to a 
single monetary policy as well as the harmonization of all future exchange rate 
relationships between EU countries. In December of 1996, the EMI presented its report 
to the European Council, which detailed the fundamental elements of the new exchange 
rate mechanism for the member states. Also, in December 1996, the EMI presented the 
design of the euro banknotes, which were set to begin circulation on January 1, 2002. 
Almost a year and a half later, on May 2, 1998, the Council of the European 
.t 
Union met and unanimously decided on the 11 member states that had fulfilled all the 
conditions necessary for the adoption of the single currency. These 11 states were 
Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, 
Portugal, and Finland. Only these states were admitted into the third and final stage of 
the EMU. An agreement was also reached at this meeting by the ministers of finance of 
these states, the governors of the national central banks of these states, the European 
Commission, and the EM I, that the current ERM bilateral central rates of the currencies 
were to be used in determining the fixed conversion rates for the euro. This meeting and 
event in particular is rather significant in that these member states of the EU are the ones 
that served as the pioneers of this financial revolution of Europe. 
Once the 11 states were chosen to continue through Stage Three, the governments 
of these states met and appointed the President, Vice-President, and four other positions 
to the Executive Board of the European Central Bank. Appointments took place on June 
1, 1998, which marked the date of the creation of the European Central Bank. Otherwise 
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known as the ECB, the establishment of this institution replaced the EM!. 
The European Central Bank along with the National Central Banks of the member 
countries formed the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), also known as the 
"Eurosystem." The ESCB is governed by several decision-making bodies, the Executive 
Board, the General Council, and the Governing Council, which is the highest decision-
making body comprising members of the executive board and the 12 governors of the 
central banks of the Eurozone. The European Central Bank is the heart of the 
"Eurosystem" and ensures that all tasks assigned to it are either accomplished by the ECB 
itself or delegated to the 11 national member banks. While the ECB holds several 
"-
responsibilities, according to the Maastricht Treaty, the European Central Bank's primary 
goal is to ensure price stability for member states. Price stability is crucial for the 
eurozone as inflation is one of the biggest threats to a country's financial stability and 
growth. Price stability is defined as a year-to year increase in consumer prices of less 
than 2%. Controlling the inflation rate is accomplished by the ECB through influencing 
inter-bank interest rates among other factors. Other responsibilities of the ECB include 
definition and implementation of the monetary policy ofthe eurozone, conducting foreign 
exchange operations, issuance of euronotes throughout eurozone, and maintenance of a 
smooth operation of payment systems. 
The European Central Bank is a critical element in the overall monetary policy 
and operations of Europe. With its base in Frankfort, Germany, a central location for the 
EU countries, the ECB must remain independent, as stipulated in Article 107 of the 
Maastricht Treaty. The greater the independence of a bank, the less likely it is to 
succumb to political pressures of the government to either grow the economy too fast or 
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finance excessive expenditures. Without this level of independence, the objective and 
unbiased nature of the bank towards all member countries and economies would be 
undermined. 
Section 2.5 The Euro Launch 
With the central bank of Europe now created and functioning to provide a more 
integrated economic environment for the member states, the next step was to introduce 
the new currency. Stage Three of the EMU began on January 5, 1999. On this date, the 
11 member countries participating in the Monetary Union permanently fixed their 
exchange rates and adopted the single monetary policy. In 1999, the euro only 
.J; 
functioned as a book unit of account whereby there were no actual euro notes or coins 
distributed. The euro was utilized in personal checks, bank statements, electronic 
records, and accounting systems. During this time, the European Union employed a "no 
compulsion, no prohibition" rule for the use of the euro. This meant that all those 
wanting to implement the euro as a book unit of account would have the legal right to do 
so but would not be forced to use it. Many larger companies at this time adopted the euro 
for financial accounting and reporting purposes however; their customers would not be 
forced to pay in euro. 
As the year continued in light of the introduction of the new euro, everything 
seemed to be working out as planned. However, by the end of the year in December 
1999, concerns among member states began to arise. By December 1999, the value of 
the euro had fallen below the US $ for the first time. Throughout 1999, the euro had 
ranged from $1.17 to as low as $.85. With anxiety high, many member states were losing 
faith in the strength of the euro. Several countries in particular had strong feelings 
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surrounding this issue and were very much against adoption of the euro. In September 
2000, in a national referendum, the Danes voted against the adoption of the euro. 
Sweden also held negative feelings towards the single currency as well as Britain, which 
had opposition towards the euro in a ratio of three to one. Nonetheless, the plans for 
transition continued with the printing of 14.5 billion euro banknotes and minting 56 
billion e urocoins. A Iso, 0 n January 1, 2001, Greece joined t he group 0 f participating 
member states in the Monetary Union. Greece's participation came as a result of a 
meeting of the European Union Council on June 19,2000 in which it was established that 
Greece had met the convergence criteria outlined in the Maastricht Treaty for eligibility 
J 
to participate in the third stage of the Economic Monetary Union. Also on June 19,2000, 
the fixing rate of the Greek Drachma to the Euro was established. 
As the euro began its initial stages by being utilized as a unit of account, the last 
and final stage was to release euronotes and coins to the general public as their new 
single currency. On January 1, 2002, known as "E-day", euro notes and coins were 
finally launched into the hands of its citizens. It was decided that two months were going 
to be given to the European citizens to make the transition from their national currencies 
to the euro. National currencies ceased to be the legal tender in the eurozone on March 1, 
2002. A fier centuries 0 f monetary and fiscal independence, these 12m ember nations 
made the final and irrevocable move to the abolishment of their national currency, which 
represented their country on so many different levels. As many countries found a sense 
of identification with their own local currency which had served as a symbol of their 
country and its independence for so many centuries, a new currency shared by 11 other 
countries is what would now be representing their country and their culture. From a 
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qualitative aspect, the introduction of this single currency of Europe is very important and 
a highly monumentus event for these 12 countries. 
Section 2.6 Further Integration in Europe 
Europe began its path of financial market integration in the 1970s with the 
passing of the First Banking Directive in 1977. This banking directive set the criteria for 
expansion across national borders within the European Community through incorporation 
of the "host country rule." Under this rule, foreign banking branches were required to 
gain permission from the host country before operations could begin.55 However, this led 
to little cross-border tran~actions. 
,~ 
The idea of integration for Europe was heavily enforced in the mid 1980s with the 
signing of the Single European Act of 1986. As summarized by President of the 
European Commission Jacques Delors, "The Single Act means, in a few words, the 
commitment of implementing simultaneously the great market without frontiers, more 
economic and social cohesion, an European research and technology policy, the 
strengthening 0 f the European Monetary System, the beginning 0 f an European social 
area and significant actions in environment."6 
A significant step towards financial integration came with the implementation of 
the Second Banking Directive in 1989. With this directive, three principles were 
established with regard to banking regulations and requirements in host and home 
countries. One principle was that of the "home country rule." This rule called for 
S FRBSF: Economic Letter- Integrating Banking Markets in the EC. Federal Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco. Retrieved Jan 27, 2003 from World Wide Web: 
http://www.frbs[orgleconrsrch/wklyltr/e19612.htrnl 
6 The Single European Act and the Treaty of the European Union. Retrieved Jan. 28, 2003 from the World 
Wide Web: http://www.historiasigle20.orgleurope/acta.htm 
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foreign branches of banks operating in foreign countries to be regulated by the home 
countries authorities and requirements, rather than the host country. This led to much 
more open and free flowing transactions between countries. The second principle was 
harmonization. Harmonization came in the form of a uniform set of safety and soundness 
standards as well as a single competitive environment for all European Community 
businesses to operate in. Essentially, a European country operating in various other 
European countries must operate under the same regulatory standards and capital 
requirements. The third principle was that of "Mutual Recognition." This established a 
,E 
single banking license fcrall banks and eliminated the need to obtain a license in each 
}i 
country of operation. This allowed for inter-nation banking and branching with the EC. 
While the process to begin full financial market integration for Europe began in 
the 1980s, it wasn't until the introduction of the Euro in January 1999, that the concept of 
financial integration actually carne into light. In May 1999, the Financial Services Action 
Plan was drafted and signed which suggested priorities and time-lines for legislative 
actions to ensure accomplishment of three objectives including insurance of a single 
market for wholesale financial services, open retail markets, and strict mles and 
supervision. This plan also called for adoption by the EU Council by the end of 1999 of 
directives on investments, distance selling of financial services, and electronic money. 
In May 2000 at the'Lisbon European Council meeting of the Heads of State and 
Government, it was set as a goal of the Union to be "the most dynamic, competitive and 
inclusive knowledge-based economic in the world by 2010.,,7 With this objective in mind 
and the direction set, at the Barcelona European Council meeting in March 2002, five 
priorities were set. One of these priorities was that of integration of the financial sector 
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to make Europe a real economic power. 
Currently, the situation surrounding financial integration in Europe has been at a 
standstill since 2000. Two main obstacles remain in the way, which has created some 
difficulty in continuing the full integration process. Dr. Sirkka HamaHiinen of the 
Executive Board of the European Central Bank discussed two main obstacles in her 
speech at the European Asset Management Conference in March 2002. One of these is of 
a regulatory nature and includes various tax and legal barriers to a completely unified 
system. However, the EU Council is implementing many new legislative proposals 
" 
including that of the Financial Services Action Plan as well as setting up a joint 
," 
committee between the ECB and the Committee of European Securities Regulators 
whose aim is to ideritify actions or standards to lower barriers to further integration.78 
Another problem is one of cross-border securities and derivatives clearing and settlement. 
This process provides public benefits however; the process of consolidation should be left 
in the hands of the private sector since they are the main owners and users of the clearing 
and settlement infrastructure. According to Dr. Sirkka Hamalainen this poses a problem 
in which those who bear the costs may not be the ones who reap the benefits in an 
integrated marketplace. Until these two groups operate together in the same level field, 
full integration will fail to occur. This issue has been under investigation, mostly by the 
Giovannini Group. Formed in 1996, the Giovannini Group is a group of financial-market 
participants who work to identify inefficiencies in the EU financial markets and propose 
solutions to improve market integration. 
Along with the problems and issues surrounding full integration, it remains at the 
7 European economic and financial integration: State of play before Barcelona. EUROPA Retrieved Jan 
27,2003 from World Wide Web: http://europa.eu.int/cornmJintemalrnarket/en/speeches/02-99.htm 
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forefront of the EU's agenda. Future work to complete this process includes adoption of 
a single European prospectus. This "single passport for issuers," after passing home 
country authority, could be used throughout the EU to raise capital.,,7 Yet much work 
remains to be able to replace 15 countries prospectuses and 15 different procedures. 
Another area of concentration for the EU is to update the Investment Services Directive-
lSD, which is a staple of the EU legislation on the financial markets whereby rules for 
exchanges and investment firms are established. Yet again, the true challenge is to find a 
common ground for 15 different countries markets, investment service providers, and 
investors.87 
J 
Since the introduction 0 f t he E uro, it has had dramatic effects 0 n t he financial 
markets, and played a major role in the integration of the member countries markets. The 
emergence of the Euro marks the finality of the European economic and monetary 
integration. No longer will each country be operating in and of itself but will be 
infinitely tied to the operations of the financial markets and economic conditions of the 
other member countries. With this interdependence of European financial markets 
effected by the Euro, many changes have taken place in recent years. The bond and 
equity markets have undergone drastic effects as well as the convergence of the member 
countries interest rates. 
Section 2.7 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I summarize the main events and highlights in the history leading 
up to the introduction of the euro. In Section 2.1, I explain the early years which 
highlighted the years from 1969-1972, the very beginning stages of economic 
g Integrating Europe's Financial Markets. ECB. Retrieved Jan. 27, 2003 fi'om the World Wide Web: 
http:www/ecb/int/key/02/sp020320.htrn 
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cooperation between the European countries. In Section 2.2, I explain the European 
Monetary System, which was a very important part to the creation of the Euro and the 
integrated European financial system. Section 2.3, The Single European Act of 1986, 
discusses the implications of this critical act in the development of the Euro as well as the 
role of several bodies of the European government including the European Parliament, 
European Commission, and the European Central Bank. The Maastricht Treaty, a major 
document which created the stages for entry into the European Monetary Union is 
explained inS ection 2.4. T he culmination 0 fa 11, the introduction 0 f t he E uro, 0 r the 
'" "Euro Launch" comprises Section 2.5. Section 2.6 discusses recent events and 
,J 
perspectives on the financial and economic integration occurring in Europe, with some 
opinions and viewpoints from some of the most important people with respect to the 
operation of the Euro, members ofthe European Central Bank. 
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FIGURE 2.1 
CHRONOLOGY OF THE EURO 
December 1969- Summit Meeting at The Hague, The Netherlands 
Meeting between the Heads of State of the European Economic Community 
for agreement on continuation of progress towards economic and monetary 
unity. 
Agreement established on close alignment of social policies. 
Reaffirmed agreement on enlargement of the European Economic 
Community. 
Agreement established on phase in of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
by 1980. 
Negotiations to begin between Denmark, Ireland, Norway, and the United 
Kingdom. 
Decision made,at meeting to hold direct elections of the European Parliament 
and increase the EP's powers. 
Final report gom Summit Meeting stated that the integration process be 
considered irreversible. 
October 1970- Publication of the Werner Report 
Luxembourg Prime Minister, Pierre Werner wrote an European Community 
report on the creation of a complete monetary union among European 
economICS. 
Werner Report appeared in 1970 and for the first time used the term 
"Economic and Monetary Union." 
Report stressed the need for monetary cooperation. 
Suggested the creation of a single European currency. 
March 22, 1971- Member States agree on harmonization of budgetary policies and 
reduction of fluctuation between currencies 
April 3, 1973- Creation of the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) 
- Created by members of the Exchange Rate Mechanism to stabilize the exchange 
rates for members of the European Union. 
July 6/7, 1978- European Council meeting- Agreement on the French-German 
proposal to launch the European Monetary System (EMS) 
Agreement reached to establish a common strategy to achieve a higher rate of 
economic growth to reduce unemployment. 
Approval of plan to create European Monetary System. 
March 13, 1979- European Monetary System created/Creation of the ECU 
Date on which the European Council met in Paris, France 
- March 13, 1979- Settled as the date for which the EMS is entered into force. 
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EMU established as an early fonn of monetary unity in which the EU 
currencies were restricted from movement to narrow trading bands known as 
parity grid in order to promote economic stability. 
European Currency Unit created on March 13, 1979 by the European 
Economic Community as -the accounting unit for the currency area of the 
European Monetary System. -
ECU used as the unit of account for the implementation of economic and 
monetary policy 
February 1986- Single European Act signed 
The 12 member nations of the European Community joined together to sign 
this Act which would remove any border checks, tariffs, customs, and capital 
and labor restrictions in an effort to unite and unify European economies. 
This act enabled the European Community to strengthen its ability to create a 
single internalJIlarket whereby goods, capital flows, and services could freely 
circulate by the end of 1992. 
First substanti~l modifications to the Treaty of Rome, signed in 1958. 
June 26/27, 1989- Approval of Delors Report and Decision to begin first stage of 
EMU 
Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission published Delors 
Report which revisited the issues ofthe Economic and Monetary Union. 
State members agreed upon establishment of a committee, presided over by 
Jacques Delors, to develop and propose key steps to fonning the European 
Monetary Union. 
Presented 3 specific stages for implementation of monetary union calling for 
the creation of a single European currency. 
Delors Report was basis for creation of committee to implement a 3 stage 
process to ultimately realize economic and monetary unification. 
July 1, 1990- The First phase of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) begins 
July 1, 1990- date established by the European Council as the beginning of the 
first stage of EMU. Important date as it is the date at which all restrictions 
placed on the movement of goods, services, labor, and capital between 
member states of the European Union were pennanently abolished. 
December 9110,1991- Draft of Treaty on European Union created 
- Called for completion of economic and monetary union and introduction of the 
single European currency, the ECU, by 1999 at latest. 
February 7, 1992- Maastricht Treaty signed 
3 stages set for completion of European Economic and Monetary Union. 
Sets criteria for admission to European Monetary Union. 
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Treaty calls for single currency, common citizenship shared among all 
members' states of European Union, Common foreign and security policy, 
more effective European Parliament, and common labor policy. 
January 1, 1994- European Monetary Institute created 
Beginning of Stage Two of the economic and monetary unionization of 
Europe called for by the Maastricht Treaty 
Marked a further commitment of progress for EU member states towards full 
cooperation 
December 15116, 1995- Madrid European Council names the European currency 
unit- "Euro" and confirms date of introduction 
Summit meeting held in Madrid, Spain by Heads of State or Government 
agreed on date of introduction and name of new currency of Europe, the 
"euro." "~ 
Scenario decided upon for implementation of "euro." 
.1-
June 1, 1998- European Central bank established 
- Establishment with the effective appointment of the President, Vice-President, 
and 4 other members of the Executive Board of the ECB. 
January 5, 1999- Launch of the Euro 
Third and final stage of EMU commencing with the fixation of the exchange 
rates of the currencies of the 11 member states which initially participated in 
the monetary union. 
Conduct of a single monetary policy operated by the European Central Bank. 
September 25, 2000- G7 nations stand in firm support of the Euro 
Investors had rushed assets out of euro-denominated assets, about $3 billion. 
G7 nations issued a statement indicating direct action to be taken to put 
upward pressure on the ailing euro. 
January 1, 2002- Euro notes and coins launched into full circulation. 
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FIGURE 2.2 
EUROPE AND EUROLAND 
Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia/Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Cgfsica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Fir,id:and, France, Gibraltar, Greece, Germany, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, 
Source: http://www.mtgsm.comltariffs/intemational_ directions.html 
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Table 2.1 
Chronology of European Organizations and Member Nations 
Year Name What- Description In Out 
1951 European Economic and Steel Created under Treaty of Paris as Gennany, France, Belgium, 
Community common market for steel and coal. Luxembourg 
Ratified in 1952. 
1957 European Economic Economic association set up by Treaty 1958- Belgium, France, Germany, 
Community (EEC) of Rome. Aims to free movement of '". It~ly, Luxembourg, Netherlands 
goods, services through abolition of 1973- UK, Ireland, Denmark 
tariffs/barriers. Common Market 1981- Greece 
created. 1983- Spain, Portugal 
I 1995- Austria, Finland, Sweden 
1967 European Union (EU) EEC merged with European Coal and France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Steel Community to fonn the EU. Luxembourg, Belgium 
1976 European Parliament 5 major party groups- European United 
Left, Party of European Socialists, 
Liberal, Democrat and Reform Group, 
Greens/European Free Alliance, 
European People's Party, European 
Democrats. Played aggressive role in 
running EU- created and launched 
initiatives. 
1979 European Monetary System Unify and stabilize member states Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
(EMS) economies. Major elements: European Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK, 
Exchange Rate Mechanism(ERM), Ireland, Denmark. 
European Currency Unit (ECU), 
European Monetary Cooperation Fund 
--
(EMCF) 
--
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1979 Exchange Rate Mechanism Fix exchange rates of currencies 1979- Germany, France, Belgium, 1992- UK& 
(ERM) between members ofEU. Currencies Denmark, Netherlands, Ireland, Italy Italy 
allowed to fluctuate between ± 2.25% 1989- Spain (fluctuation of ± 6.6%) 
against other currencies. 1990- UK (fluctuation of ± 6.6%) 
1992- Portugal (fluctuation of ± 6.6%) 
1995- Austria 
1996- Finland, Italy re-entered at 15% 
1979 European Currency Unit "Unit of Account" created as part of 1979-1984- Belgium, Germany, 
(ECU) EMS. Value ofECU was weighted Denmark, France, UK, Ireland, Italy, 
average basket of specified amounts of Luxembourg, Netherlands. 
European currencies. Acted as unit for 1984-1989- Greece joined 
all transactions within EU. --
1989-1999- Spain and Portugal joined 
1979 European Monetary Fund organized by EMS where members 1979- Belgium, France, Germany, 
Cooperation Fund (EMCF) ofEU deposit reserves to provide a pool Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK, 
of resources to stabilize exchange rates Ireland, Denmark 
and finance balance of payments 
support. 
1998 European Central Bank (ECB) Seat: Frankfurt, Germany. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
3 main decision-making bodies: France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Governing Council, Executive Board, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
General Council. Main responsibility: Portugal, Spain, Sweden 
Qrice stability within the Eurozone 
r---
Euro became the first single currency for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Jan. 1, the European Union nations. Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
1999 The Introduction of the Euro Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain 
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Table 2.2 
Chronology of Treaties and Reports 
,----~ 
Year Name What- Description In Out 
- -
1957 Treaty of Rome Established European Economic Community. 1958- Belgium, France, Germany, 
Called for common market within 12 years and by Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands 
gradually removing trade restrictions and barriers. 1973- UK, Ireland, Denmark 
1981- Greece 
1983- Spain, Portugal 
~-~~- -~ 
1295- Austria, Finland, Sweden 
1970 Werner Report Presented by Prime Minister of Luxembourg-
Pierre Werner. Discussed need for monetary 
cooperation and suggested creation of single 
European currency. 
c-----~ ~-~ 
1989 Delors Report Detailed 3 stage plan for implementation of 
monetary union. Called for creation of single 
currency for Europe. 
1991 Maastricht Treaty Maastricht, Netherlands. Provided for single Ratified by: Belgium, Denmark, 
European currency, common citizenship, common France, Germany, UK, Greece, 
foreign and security policy, More effective Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
European Parliament, common labor policy. Netherlands, Portugal, Spain 
Established 5 criteria for member states to 
accomplish to be considered for adoption of new, 
single currency. 
1996 Stability & Growth Called for all countries to aim at achieving a Ratified by: Austria, Belgium, 
Pact balanced budget and countries. A budget deficit Finland, France, Germany, Greece 
over 3% would be fined up to 0.5% GDP. Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain 
L~ ~_ ~ __ ~
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORY AND EVIDENCE ON ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND A 
COMMON CURRENCY 
Economic integration in the broadest sense c an be d efinecl as" a breakdown 0 f 
barriers between nations in order to create a common market with a free flow of goods 
and services." As expres~ed by Juergen Schroeder of the University of Mannheim, 
Mannheim, Germany in his article European monetary and economic integration: 
J 
present state and future directions, " Economic integration refers to the merging of 
national economies and the blurring of the boundaries that separate the economic activity 
of one nation-state from that of another. The different aspects of economic integration 
include free trade, common external tariffs, complete factor mobility and harmonization 
and centralization of economic policy. I Economic integration has been a critical element 
in the creation and development of the European Union, and ultimately to the 
introduction of the Euro in 1999. The theory of economic integration within Europe 
consists of many aspects which drive forward the continuation of the integration process 
for the 12 member states and the other European countries that will eventually join the 
EU. In this chapter, I will discuss the theory behind economic integration and how it 
relates to Europe, discuss the role of common currency and how it relates to the Euro, and 
I will end with discussion and analysis of financial market integration with an emphasis 
on the market integration in Europe. 
Section 3.1 Economic Integration 
Economic integration encompasses various dimensions with increasing levels of 
integration. The free trade area in the weakest form of integration is simply the breaking 
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down of tariffs and quantitative restrictions on trade between member countries.9 The 
next level is the customs union which comprises a free trade area along with a common 
external tariff policy. Even more integration and dependence appears in the form of a 
common market whereby a customs union is established with complete mobility of 
factors of production and for the first time, a harmonization of economic and monetary 
policies. The strongest form of integration appears in an economic and monetary 
"union. fI In this union, economic policy is central rather than a coordination of monetary 
policies as in the common market. The common market is more integrated than the 
customs union since it involves a single market for goods, services, and factors of 
production. The European Common Market was establi;:;hed upon the ratification of the 
I 
Single European Act in 1986. 
Drivers behind the theory of economic integration include problems associated 
with fixed exchange rates between currencies, anti-inflationary pressures, exchange rate 
stability, coordination of monetary policies between each other, competition, 
unemployment, and high transition costs. 
According to Whyman (2002), "the deflationary bias within the Stability and 
Growth Pact and the Maastricht Convergence Criteria reduced potential EU GDP growth 
by an estimated 5% during the 1990s, also resulting in an additional 7-10 million 
unemployed. High costs of transition are another severe problem associated with 
economic integration." According to Whyman, "The European Banking Federation 
calculated that the EU banks are likely to spend between £6.3 and £7.9 billion over a 4 
year period amounting to 2% of operating costs for each changeover year. The British 
Retail Consortium has estimated the cost of currency changeover for its national retail 
sector to cost approximately £3.5 billion, with 17% of this total resulting from 6 months 
9 Schroeder, Juergen. (2000). European monetary and economic integration: present state and future 
directions. Journal of Asian Economics, 11. 23-29. 
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of dual labeling of all products after the introduction of the single currency." 10 
Costs associated with adaptation are also an issue. In one study by KMPG 
Consulting in 1999, to take one EU member state, for example u.K., which has 3,000 
companies with more than 5,000 employees and assuming each spend £3.5 million on 
adaptation to EMU, this would total £107.4 billion. This represents 10-11 % ofU.K GDP. 
Beginning with the fixed exchange rates between currencies, problems surround a 
fixed exchange rate regime, as evidenced by the breakdown of the Bretton Woods fixed 
exchange rate regime from 1945-1973. These problems include shocks to currencies 
which can push the currency out of the permitted range causing an overvaluation in 
" 
which the country would have to sell reserves to reduce its value. There must be a strong 
,i 
level of fiscal/monetary policy set in a country, which can be a problem, for a fixed 
exchange rate system to be maintained. Also, under fixed systems, interest rates are 
equated among the member countries, yet one country can set the interest rates to be 
favorable to their domestic needs rather than the needs of the whole group of countries. 
This can cause friction among the countries as common interests of all are being 
dominated by one country. 
Another aspect to the theory of monetary integration concerns inflation among the 
member states. Inflation is one of the most prominent threats to a country's economic 
stability and growth. Through the European Central Bank, which governs the euro, and 
ultimately integrates all economies of the European Union, the objective of price stability 
by inflation control is fulfilled. With this coordinated approach to controlling inflation by 
the aid of a central bank, all countries can decide and agree on a common monetary 
policy, with all countries interests being represented. The ECU, created by the EMS, as 
the neutral unit of account to measure divergence, dictates that those countries whose 
currency deviates too much would have to take action through the monetary policy. 
10 Whyman, Philip. (2002). Living with the Euro: the consequences for world business. Journal of World 
Business, 37. 208-215. 
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Therefore, a common fiscal policy is crucial to full economic integration and cooperation 
between all EU countries. 
Centralization of budgets and fiscal policies is another driver behind economic 
integration. By centralizing budgets, a country who is suffering from the shock of a 
deficit would be able to regain fiscal stability by benefiting from the budget surplus of 
another country thus creating automatic stabilization. Stabilization is another critical 
aspect behind integration. The "Stability and Growth Pact" was established between the 
countries of the EU in 1996. In summary, this pact called for all countries to aim at 
achieving a balanced budget and countries with a budget deficit over 3% would be fined 
up to 0.5% GDP. With such strict limits on government spending, this pact stimulated 
much long-term fiscal discipline within the EU, which is a staple of monetary union? 
Other drivers behind economic integration for Europe include the various benefits 
that the EU will reap with total integration. Reduced transaction costs,. price transparency 
between countries, increased efficiency, increased international competitiveness among 
firms in EU, and increased growth potential for the European economy. Reduced 
transaction costs are an especially important outcome of fiscal union as costs associated 
with trades between countries are substantial, amounting to billions. The European 
Commission estimates that, before the euro, European businesses converted $7.7 
trillion/year from one EU currency to another, ultimately paying $12.8 billion in 
conversion charges, or .4% of European Union GDP.3 These costs are tremendous for 
smaller firms whose liquidity and sophistication of banking and financial systems may be 
underdeveloped.3)I 
The benefit of price transparency is also a vital part of monetary union. As 
countries economies and currencies are tied together, price differences between goods 
and services in various countries are more obvious, in effect creating competition across 
II Chabot, C. (1999). Understanding the Euro- The Clear and Concise Guide to the New Trans-European 
Economy. New York: McGraw-Hill 
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markets. European consumers find comparing prices of the same goods and services 
across national boundaries rather cumbersome and tiring. With more integration and a 
single market, European consumers would find it easier to compare prices in different 
countries, which forces those businesses to maintain a competitive edge and produce the 
highest quality products with the lowest prices. 
Increased efficiency in transactions and trades occurs by integration as no future 
plan for exchange rate fluctuation is necessary. Importers who bear a large exchange rate 
risk when importing goods to Europe are not faced with the burden of hedging and the 
costs associated with heQ.ging. With monetary union, importers are much freer to 
JI' 
increase imports and increase their overall business and exposure to the European 
.,~ 
markets. One example is DaimlerChrysler, an international company which reaped 
benefits of the lack of currency hedging costs associated with the introduction of the 
Euro. DaimlerChrysler saved roughly €50 million per year with the elimination of 
transaction and exchange rate hedging costs associated with organizational processes and 
projectsl5 . However, importers are not the only beneficiaries. Through economic 
integration, firms in the EU appear increasingly attractive to international investors. 
Through increased liquidity in the markets, elimination of currency confusion, and an 
overall strengthened European economy through union, investors looking to invest in 
Europe will be much more likely to invest and continue with long-term investments in 
Euroland. With a decreased level of uncertainty in the European economic condition and 
currency risks due to heightened integration, the EU can be expected to have a surge of 
international capital investments, which will add much growth to the European integrated 
economy. 
Presently, statistics on the European Union and the impact that economic arid 
monetary integration has had on these countries is proving that integration is a success for 
these European member nations. The poorer countries of the union have shown the most 
improvement. The average growth rates of these countries such as Ireland, Spain, arid 
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Portugal have been higher than that of stronger countries such as Gennany. From the 
period 1986-1995, these three countries all had higher Real GDP numbers than that of 
Gennany's 2.1, with Ireland having 5.1, Spain at 2.7, and Portugal at 2.2. Since being in 
the economic union, Ireland's GDP rate has grown rapidly and Spain's has doubled.! 
Since the economic and monetary union with the free movement of goods, services, 
labor, and capital; all member countries have been better off. All members have made 
welfare gains as a result of larger input and sales markets, and the poorer countries have 
benefited through massive transfers from the richer countries.! 
While Europe has ,implemented the strongest level of integration, an economic 
/l" 
and monetary union, the next level of dependence for these European nations is to adopt a 
J 
common currency, the "Euro," which they did in January 1999. 
Section 3.2 Common Currency 
The theory behind a common currency consists of many issues and areas of 
discussion. While the advantages of fixing the exchange rates include elimination of 
exchange rate risk and reduced transaction costs, as well as the centralization of monetary 
policy, the disadvantages include lack of independent monetary policy for that country. 
The concept 0 f a centralized monetary policy h as been thought 0 f as 0 ne 0 f t he most 
important benefits of fixed exchange rates. Economist D. Mario Nuti (2002) states, "a 
government lacking policy creditability can "borrow" creditability by anchoring the 
national currency to a strong and credible currency.,,12 While one ofthe biggest threats to 
a country's economic condition is that of inflation, a central bank is able to provide more 
protection against inflation than that of an independent bank. With a fixed exchange rate 
and a central bank that is committed to a single monetary policy, workers and finns who 
set the wages and prices can more effectively forecast future prices. The result is a lower 
12 Nuti, D. Mario. (2002). A Symposium on Exchange rate regimes in transition economies: The 
euroization debate. Costs & Benefits of Unilateral euroization in Central Easte:rn Europe. Th~'-2lli?.!ID!~ 
of Transition, 10. 419-444 
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level of inflation. 
Besides the basic drivers behind the theory of common currency, common 
currency cannot be discussed without addressing the Theory of Optimum Currency 
Areas. This theory's basis rests on the decision by a country of whether or not to peg or 
float its currency with its neighbors. Much of this decision depends on closeness of the 
country's ties to trading and the business cycles of its neighboring c()untries. 13 
The optimum currency area is defined by Frankel and Rose (1996) as "a region 
that is neither so s mall and 0 pen that it would be better 0 ff pegging its currency to a 
neighbor, nor so large that)t would be better off splitting into sub-regions with different 
,of' 
currencies 13." This theory rests on the assertions that the advantages of adopting a 
J' 
common currency depend positively on the trade integration and the abandonment of the 
independence in monetary policy. There are several criteria that the Theory of Optimum 
Currency Area details when looking at an area to decide if it constitutes as an optimum 
currency area. These include exchange rate uncertainty, independence of monetary 
policy, and ease of labor movement between countries. Regarding the first criterion, as 
the trading activity between the countries increases; the risk of exchange rate uncertainty 
becomes a more serious issue. Within the European region, trades of goods and services 
have been increasing over time and will continue to increase as more countries enter into 
the European Union. This will cause the use of a common currency to be much more 
beneficial and save in millions of dollars in transaction costs. Secondly, the issue of 
pursing an independent monetary policy is a chief disadvantage of using a fixed exchange 
rate, however, as more countries economies become more integrated and will depend on 
each other; this point proves to be rather weak, according to Frankel and Rose. With all 
the member states of the European Union working together to achieve complete fiscal 
interdependence, this advantage of independence in monetary policy is not so beneficial. 
13 Economic structure and the Decision to Adopt a Common Currency. Retrieved on Feb 26, 2003 from the 
World W ide Web: http://wwwjies.su.se/publications/ seminarpapers/611.pdf 
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As economic integration and the labor and fiscal mobility increase within the 
European countries, the European Union looks like an optimum currency area and one 
that would justify the use and benefit highly from a common cUITIency. 
Other issues and impacts surround the strategic decision for a country or set of 
-
countries to adopt a common currency. Nuti (2002) lists other benefits to adoption of a 
single currency including credibility, lower transaction costs, lower interest rates, greater 
macroeconomic stability, and greater trade and foreign investment. Lower nominal 
interest rates are likely with a single currency which will promote investment and growth. 
Both governments and p~vate investors benefit from a common currency through the 
,< 
ability to borrow internationally in their domestic currency and the same currency in 
J 
which the expenditure i's denominated and incurred. Greater macroeconomic stability 
and greater trade and foreign direct investment are both benefits incurred by countries 
that choose to adopt a common currency. Countries are more self-regulated and many 
costs associated with exchange rate changes and adjustments are eliminated due to a 
single currency for the nations. 
John C. Soper (1999) also discussed the advantages behind the single currency. 
According to Soper, "the strongest economic argument for implementing a single 
currency includes the reduction or elimination of currency-conversion transaction costs as 
traders move from one euroland country to another with goods and services for sale.,,14 
As the transaction costs fall, trade expands. Soper also adds that with the introduction of 
the euro, this will create an "integrated European market with 290 million customers. 
This market will be larger than the United States, with its 270 million consumers.6" 
Section 3.3 Financial Integration 
While a common currency leads to unification and economic stability, a common 
currency among countries also involves financial market integration among those 
14 Soper, John C. (1999). Macroeconomic Effects of Euro Implementation. Managerial Finance, 25. 3-7 
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countries. 
Karolyi and Stulz (2002) define Financial Market Integration as "Markets in 
which cash flows have the same price regardless of where claims to the cash flows trade 
are said to be integrated. In such settings, assets have the same price regardless of where 
they are traded and no finance is local; there are no transportation costs, no tariffs, no 
taxes, no transaction costs, no convertibility restrictions, and no restrictions on short 
sales,,715 As Juan Ayuso and Roberto Blanco (2001) explain in their paper Has financial 
market integration increased during the nineties? "Perfect cross-market integration is 
generally understood as a,. situation in which there is no barrier of any kind to cross-
," 
border financial transactions, such as tariffs, taxes, restrictions on the trading of foreign 
,J 
assets, information c ost5 0 r any 0 ther cost t hat makes it more difficult tot rade a cross 
countries than within them."l6 
Why do countries want to participate in integrating their financial markets with 
other surrounding countries? As Shigemitsu Sugisaki, Deputy M,maging Director of the 
International Monetary Fund, stated, "Economic theory tells us that the free movement of 
capital permits a more efficient global allocation of savings and directs resources toward 
their most efficient use. This movement raises the level of welfare in both the sending 
country and in the receiving country by creating opportunities for portfolio 
diversification, risk-sharing, and inter-temporal trade."l7 By removing trade barriers, this 
leads to a reduction in business costs as well as simulating efficiency and creating more 
jobs and wealth. Increased financial market integration leading to a single market 
promotes greater competition and liberalization which in tum creates lower prices for 
customers in those markets as well as creates a larger market by which customers have a 
15 Karolyi, G.A. & Stulz, Rene. (2002). International Capital Markets,!' 1-2, 
16 Ayuso, Juan & Blanco, Roberto. (2001). Has fmancial market integration increased during the nineties? 
Journal ofInternational Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 11. 265-269 
17 The Benefits and Risks Associated with the Wider Integration of International Financial Markets. 
International Monetary Fund Retrieved Jan 27, 2003 from World Wide Web: 
http://www.inforglexternallnp/speeches/1998/120598.htm 
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much larger choice. More market integration also breaks down monopolies and cartels 
and unifies national standards. ,.IS 
Just as there are many benefits to international financial market integration, there 
are also various costs and problems associated with such a large, widespread type of 
integration as that of the financial markets. Sylvester Eijffinger and Jan. Lemmen (2000) 
discussed these various problems in their publication International Financial Integration. 
These problems include constrains on national choices regarding monetary and fiscal 
policies as well as the possibility of excessive borrowing through integrated markets. 
Another issue posed with ,such an open, integrated market is the decision of whether to 
,.t 
control interest rates or exchange rates. Taxation is also an issue as it is more difficult to 
J 
tax international capitarin relation to more stable factors of production. Eijffinger and 
Lemmen also point out that "dissimilar legal stmctures" pose a problem as a part of the 
financial stmcture of a country depends on the "legal rights of shareholders and creditor, 
as well as on the degree to which the relevant laws are enforced.,,19 
For the European Union and the member countries, the culmination of integration 
was that 0 f complete financial market integration. This was t he I ast a nd final step to 
completing the definition of an "Economic and Financial Union for Europe." 
This was always the overriding goal and intent from the establishment of the European 
Union. As stated by Dr. Sirkka Hamall1inen (2002), member of the Executive Board of 
the European Central Bank at the European Asset Management Conference in Frankfurt, 
Germany, "More generally, well-integrated financial markets are an obvious prerequisite 
for an optimal allocation of capital in the European Union. This itself is necessary to 
achieve the goals of the Community, among which- and I q[uote from the Treaty 
establishing the European Community- "to promote economic and social progress and a 
18 McConnick, 1. (2002).Understanding the European Union- A Concise Introduction. New York: 
PALGRAVE 
19 Financial Market Integration in the US: Lessons for Europe? Kiel Institute of World Economics 
Retrieved Jan 27, 2003 from W orId Wide Web: http://www.uni-kiel.de/ifw/pub/kap/2000/kapl 004.pdf 
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high level of employment, and to achieve balanced and sustainable development, m 
particular through the creation of an area without internal frontiers.,,2o 
There are many reasons with which to build a case as to why Europe would want 
to pursue complete financial market integration. An integrated sector will lower the cost 
of capital for 18 million businesses in the EU as well as contribute to an annual economic 
growth with about 1 % annually.21 Financial market integration will increase the global 
competitiveness for Europe, attract more foreign investment, and also help to develop the 
small and midsize businesses of Europe. Social benefits such as better pensions, higher 
returns for individual inyestors, and more venture capital will also be gained by 
integration. Most of all for Europe, economic power and stability are the greatest 
J 
benefits obtained through complete financial market integration. As stated by 
Commissioner Frits Bolkestein, member of the European Commission, "In order to better 
withstand external shocks of whatever kind, we must make Europe a pole of economic 
stability. Financial integration will help us achieve this, now and in the future." 22 
Section 3.4 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I discuss the three mam areas pertaining to Economic and 
Financial Integration in relation to the Euro. Section 3.1, Economic Integration discusses 
various aspects to the theory behind economic integration including various drivers 
associated with economic integration in general, as well as drivers associated specifically 
with economic integration in Europe. I include statistics on certain country control 
factors such as GDP and other examples to illustrate my points. Section 3.2, Common 
Currency focuses on the theory behind the adoption of a common currency for a country, 
15 DamilerChrysler Completes Introduction of the EURO. Retrieved April 20, 2003 from World Wide 
Web: http://www.damilerchrysler.comlnews/top/2001/tII126 e.htm 
20 I ntegrating Europe's Financial Markets. E CB. Retrieved Ja n. 27, 2003 from the World W ide Web: 
http:www/ecb/intikey/02/sp020320.htrn 
21 European economic and financial integration: State of play before Barcelona. EUROPA Retrieved Jan 
27,2003 from World Wide Web: http://europa.eu-int/comrn/internalmarketlenispeeches/02-99.htm 
22 Integration of Financial Markets in Europe. EUROPA. Retrieved Jan 28,2003 from World Wide Web: 
http://europa.eu.intlcomrn/internalmarketlenlspeeches/spch331.htm 
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and discusses factors and issues, including advantages and disadvantages, which lead 
countries to make the decision of whether or not to adopt a common currency. In the 
final section, Section 3.3, Financial Integration, I define Financial Market Integration and 
I ask the question, "Why do countries want to integrate their financial markets?" I 
attempt to answer this question and confer reasons as to why countries, especially those 
in Europe would want to engage in integration. I discuss both positive and negative 
aspects to European economic integration. 
Chapter 2 and 3 set the background for the statistical analysis and the next 
chapter, Chapter 4, entitled"Empirical Analysis." 
,£ 
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Section 4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, t here are two fundamental questions and hypotheses t hat I will 
pose and answer in relation to the Euro and the financial markets of Europe and the 
world: 
1. Has the introduction of the Euro changed volatility in the stock, bond and 
if 
interest rate markets? 
.• J 
2. Which countries benefited the most from the Euro and Why? 
My hypothesis is that the Euro has reduced volatility in all these markets: stock, bond 
and interest rate in all countries with the introduction of the Euro. My second hypothesis 
is that the European countries who are members of the Euro and those who engage in 
more international capital and trade flows benefited more than those countries that do not. 
Countries with more fragile economies, including those with more volatile exchange rates 
and a slower, poorer rate of growth should have benefited more than countries with 
stronger economies as they already had stable economies before the introduction of the 
euro. I will also address other institutional and country specific factors which will 
differentiate those countries that benefited the most from those that did not. 
Section 4.2 Methodology 
Volatility of the market is regarded as the statistical measure of a market index to 
rise or fall sharply within a short period of time. Several measures can be used to 
measure the volatility of a market which includes the standard deviation of the prices or 
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returns on the market, and the overall fluctuation in the prices of an index over a specific 
time period. I gathered data from stock market indices of the 12 Euro countries as well as 
17 Non-Euro countries using Datastream International. I calculated percent changes in 
daily returns which were used to run the variance function in Excel to calculate the 
statistical variance in the daily returns. Variance is the measure of the variability or 
volatility away from the average of the data calculated. I calculated the variance of the 
returns for both the Post-Euro period, from 111/1999 to 1/112003, and the Pre-Euro 
period, from 1/111996 to 12/31/1998. The data was separated into these periods in order 
to analyze and identify any significant differences in the variances. Next, a variance ratio 
was calculated with the tumerator as variance post-euro and the denominator as variance 
pre-euro. This compared the volatility in the post-euro period to that of the pre-euro 
period. Standard Deviation, which is a standardized measure of the volatility of the 
stock, was also calculated for these countries. A higher deviation implies higher 
volatility. Standard deviation for post and p re-euro periods was calculated to analyze 
major changes in the data. 
The same procedure was completed on data for Euro and Non-Euro countries 
using Morgan Stanley Capital International Bonds Indexes, which are denominated in 
Local or Euros and in US dollar denominations as well as short-term interest rates for 
Euro and non-Euro countries. Short term interest rates included interbank and overnight 
interest rates. Short term rates were chosen as they provided the right base to evaluate 
the true volatility of the interest rate market rather than longer term rates featured in the 
bond indexes. 
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The variance ratios are distributed statistically a s a F -Distribution and for each 
ratio I computed the associated p-value. The p-value estimates the probability that a 
variant or a statistic would assume a value greater than or equal to the observed value 
strictly by chance. This is a very important calculation in my analysis since one of the 
main objectives of the overall analysis is to state with a fair amount of certainty, if the 
volatility of the various financial markets in Euro and non-Euro countries were impacted 
by the introduction of the Euro, or if the volatility in the markets is simply by random 
chance or occurrence. Therefore, by calculation of the p-value I was able to evaluate the 
amount of chance that wls involved in the calculations. A scale was used to determine, 
in the results, the amounland degree of certainty of chance and non-chance. 
Non-chance means the definite involvement of the Euro as an element of impact in the 
volatility of the markets. A star system was utilized to present the results. Below 
« 10%) or Above (>90%) = *, Below «5%) or Above (>95%) =**, and Below «1%) or 
Above (>99%) =***. A p-value less than 10% or greater than 90% indicates a significant 
break in the data and a low level of confidence that the volatility change is due to chance 
but that the Euro has had a significant influence in the volatility in the markets. A p-
value of less than 1 % or greater than 99% indicates a very high level of confidence that 
the volatility in the markets is due to chance rather than a specific influence. 
All statistical measures calculated here were critical factors in establishing the 
base for regression analysis on the stock, bond, and short term interest rate markets. 
Linear Regression determines and illustrates a relationship between two variables by 
fitting a linear equation to the observed data. One variable serves as the explanatory or 
independent variable and the other as the dependent variable. Linear Regression is 
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conducted on the presented data for Stocks, Bonds Local, Europe, and US denominated, 
and Short Term Interest Rates, as the objective of the analysis is to determine ifthere is a 
relationship between the Euro and market volatility, which linear regression would 
statistically be best able to measure. 
Linear Regression was calculated using the Data analysis tools of Regression in 
Microsoft Excel software. Inputs included the variance ratio for each country, the natural 
log of the variance ratio, and dummy variables for Euro and non-Euro countries. The 
Euro countries carried a dummy variable of 1 and the non-Euro countries carried a 
" 
dummy variable of O. diher variables were included to project any effect they would 
have on the overall resulfs of volatility. These variables were Pre-Euro Volatility, GDP-
2001, Inflation-2001, Exports/GDP-2001, and Imports/GDP- 2001. Three separate 
regressions were conducted on all markets. While all regression experiments included 
the natural log of the variance ratio, various other variables were included for each 
regreSSIOn. 
For the first regression, only the dummy variable was added. This measured the 
difference in volatility between the Euro and non-Euro countries simply based on the 
variance ratios of those countries. The second regression included Pre-Euro Volatility. 
This regression accounted for the possibility that the impact on volatility was due to 
random chance, taking into account the volatility of the country before the Euro was 
introduced. If the country had a low volatility beforehand, than an expected or actual 
decrease in volatility due to the introduction of the Euro may not confidently be 
confirmed. The third regression included several other variables along with Pre-Euro 
Volatility, including GDP, Inflation, Exports/GDP, and ImportslGDP. These country 
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specific factors were very important to include in order to evaluate whether or not they 
had a significant impact on the overall market volatility, in which the intro of the Euro 
would not completely account for the change. 
Section 4.3 Data 
Table 1 begins with the description of the Indices that I examined. Panel A 
consists of the stock indices of Euro and non-Euro countries. Panel B consists of the 
bond indices and Panel C highlights the short term interest rate indices. Each panel 
, 
describes the index with tff~ name, the mneomic code, used to research in Datastream 
International, as well as t~e available dates of data. Tables 2, 3A, 3B, and 4 include the 
set ofEuro and non-Euro countries and lists the standard deviations, number of days 
included in the pre-euro periods and post-euro periods, variance ratios, and p-values for 
each country. A star system as described previously was utilized and included in tables 
2, 3A, 3B, and 4 to indicate the level of confidence that the volatility of the index was 
due to chance or not for that country. A median score was also included to easily indicate 
what the general trend was for the set ofEuro countries and the set ofnon-Euro countries. 
Also, it is important to note that table 3A includes both Local and Euro denominations for 
the bond indices and table 3B is the bond indices in US dollar denominations. 
Tables 5 through 8 are the results of linear regression analysis conducted on Euro 
and non-Euro countries for stock, bond, and short term interest rate markets. Table 5 
indicates the results for the Stock market return volatility regression results for Euro and 
non-Euro countries. Table 6 indicates the results for the US-dollar denominated Bond 
return volatility regression results for Euro and non-Euro countries. Table 7 indicates the 
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results for the Local currency denominated bond return volatility regression results for 
Euro and non-Euro countries, and table 8 indicates the short term interest rate volatility 
regression for Euro and non-Euro countries. Each table encompass the natural log of the 
variance ratio and the Euro dummy variable, as well as several country specific control 
factors for Euro and non-Euro countries: Pre-euro volatility, GDP- 2001, Inflation-200 1, 
Exports/GDP- 2000, and Imports/GDP-2000. These years indicated consisted ofthe 
most current data for the countries chosen to analyze. 
Considering the procedure related to the linear regression analysis, I completed 3 
regressions for each mark€t. Through the regressions, one variable builds upon another. 
As I progress to the third/analysis for each market and each country, more factors relating 
specifically to a possible change in volatility, factors which could have an impact on the 
volatility within the markets such as GDP, Inflation, Exports/GDP, and Imports/GDP are 
introduced into the analysis. However, as will be illustrated and discussed in the next 
section, these factors had no significant impact on the overall results. 
Section 4.4 Results 
Overall, the results of this experiment were rather inconsistent with the stated 
hypothesis. To begin, in the stock market, the post-euro volatility, or the standard 
deviation, of both Euro and Non-Euro countries was higher than the volatility before the 
introduction of the Euro. This is in opposition to the hypothesis that with the introduction 
of a single currency, the volatility should be reduced. A single currency should provide 
stability and more integrated financial systems and policies, for both Euro countries and 
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Non-Euro countries so an increase of 13% for Euro countries and 8% for Non-Euro 
countries was unexpected. 
In regards to the variance ratios and p-values for both sets of countries for the 
stock markets (Table 2), the Euro countries had a slightly higher median variance ratio at 
1.23 than the Non-Euro countries with a median of 1. However, the p..:values for both 
sets were very different but resulted in the same level of confidence concerning the 
volatility being due to chance. In my analysis of the variance ratios and the stock market, 
81.8%, 9 out of 11 of the Euro countries and 92.8%, 13 out of 14 of the Non-Euro 
" 
countries exhibited a p-v~lue indicating a high level of confidence that the volatility in 
the markets was due to ctance (Table 2). In the bond market-US, 96.7, 30 out of 31 of 
the Euro countries and 71.4%, 10 out of 14 of the non-Euro countries exhibited p-values 
with a very high level of confidence of the volatility being due to chance (Table 3B). In 
the bond market Local/Euro, 95%, or 19 out of 20 of the Euro countries and 56%, or 5 
out of 9 countries exhibited p-values with a very high level of confidence of the volatility 
being due to chance (Table 3A). In regards to the short term interest rate market, 7 out of 
10, 70% ofEuro countries and 7 out of9, or 77.8% of the Non-Euro countries resulted in 
a high level of confidence in chance volatility (Table 4). The median p-value for the 
Euro countries was .00087, where the median value for the Non-Euro countries was 
.50590. However, as stated above concerning the star system, these values constitute 
***, in which there is a very high level of confidence that the volatility within the market 
is due to chance r ather than to a specific factor, such as the introduction 0 f the E uro. 
Therefore, the results indicate that there is no certainty with which to attribute any 
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volatility changes within the equity markets to the Euro in either the Euro or Non-Euro 
countries. 
The Bond market was broken in the Local/Europe and the US denominated bond 
markets for Euro and Non-Euro countries (Table 3A, 3B). The results for the 
Local/Europe and US Bond markets of Euro countries were similar to that of the Stock 
Market. There was a marginal 1 % difference between the pre and post euro volatilities 
for the Local/Europe bonds and a 2% difference for the US bonds. The variance ratio 
was considerably higher for the US bonds but the p-values for both were very similar. 
" The p-values for both wef~ also very small with .000126 and .0000 for the Local/Europe 
and US 'respectively. A~ain, this indicates a high level of confidence of the volatility 
being due to chance. The Non-Euro countries contained a bit more intriguing data. The 
variance ratios between the Local/Europe and US bonds were similar at .9706 and 1.20 
respectively, but the median p-values were very different. The p-value for the 
Local/Europe bond was .6734, where the US p-value was .00333. With the Local/Europe 
bonds, there is. a break in the data, and there is a lower level of confidence that the 
variability is due to chance but rather has a significant factor involved in its variability. 
However, with the US bonds, it can be said that the variability is due to chance more than 
any specific factor involved. 
The results for the Short Term Interest Rates were very different than that of the 
Stock and Bond Markets, especially concerning the PrelPost Euro volatilities (Table 4). 
The Euro countries experienced an increase in volatility in the interest rates by 7% after 
the Euro was introduced but the Non-Euro countries experienced a decline in volatility of 
62%, from 82% pre-euro to 24% post euro. Though many of the Non-Euro countries did 
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1 . 
not provide enough information to accurately conduct tests and calculate results, for those 
countries that did have enough information, this proved to be a dramatic change. The 
variance ratios were also very different, yet the p-values were not. The Euro countries 
exhibited a value of.00000051892 with the Non-Euro countries at 1. Both these p-values 
again resulted in a high level of confidence that the volatility change was due to chance, 
just like that ofthe stock and bond markets. 
In regards to the Regression Analysis for the Stock market, the results were rather 
uneventful (Table 5-8). There appeared to be no significant differences in volatility 
between the Euro and Non-Euro countries in regards to the stock, bond and short-term 
interest tate markets fro~ pre-euro to post-euro. Concerning the stock and interest rate 
markets, countries which tended to have rather high pre-euro volatility resulted in lower 
volatility post-euro. However, this was not the same for the bond market. The bond 
market resulted in countries that had higher pre-euro volatility continued to have high 
volatility post-euro. The introduction of the euro however, did not have a significant 
influence in the overall increase in the volatility. Several reasons or explanations can be 
proposed to account for changes in the volatility. One is just statistical error. Countries 
with unusually high (low) pre-euro volatility could possibly have large positive 
(negative) volatility estimation errors. Another explanation is economics. Countries that 
exhibited high (low) pre-euro volatility would implement monetary and fiscal policies in 
that country to reduce (increase) volatility of the market. 
In general, there are negligible differences in volatilities pre vs. post euro for Euro 
and non-Euro countries; therefore, the euro had no significant influence on volatility 
changes for Euro and non-Euro countries. 
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Section 4.5 Conclusions 
Returning to the original objective, there were two questions proposed along with 
the hypotheses. Those questions were 
1. Has the introduction of the Euro changed volatility in the stock, bond and 
interest rate markets? 
2. Which countries benefited the most from the Euro and Why? 
My hypotheses were: 
1. The Euro has reduc'ed volatility in all these markets: stock, bond and interest rate 
in alI countries with tte introduction of the Euro. 
2. The European countries who are members of the European Union and those who 
engage in more international capital and trade flows benefited more than those 
countries that do not. 
Upon experimentation and results, it appears that the euro has not had a significant 
influence on the. volatility in any of the markets, stock, bond, or short term interest rate. 
No country specific factors such as GDP, Exports/GDP, Imports/GDP, or even Inflation 
proved to have a significant influence on the change in the volatility within any of the 
markets for both countries who are part of Euroland and those which are non-Euroland 
countries. 
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CHAPTERS 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this thesis was to detennine whether the introduction of the Euro 
had an impact on international financial markets. The overall conclusion is that it has 
not. Based on my analysis of the history of economic and financial integration in Europe 
and on the existing theore1ical and empirical research on common currencies, I proposed 
the hyp()thesis that volat'flity within the markets should have been reduced due to the 
introduction of a single currency. The reasons behind this hypothesis include the 
elimination of conversion costs and exchange rate risk between those countries adopting 
the euro, as well as greater overall market integration within the Euro countries. My 
empirical analysis compared daily stock return, bond return, and interest rate volatility 
before and after .the January 1, 1999. Through statistical analysis, such as variance ratios 
and linear regression models, the results indicate that the changes in volatility within the 
stock, bond, and short tenn interest rate markets, while negligible for both Euro and non-
Euro countries, cannot be confidently attributed to the introduction of the Euro. With the 
addition of other country specific factors into the regression models, the results remained 
very similar. Therefore, the overall conclusion is that the volatility within the markets 
might possibly be due to chance but cannot be attributed to the introduction of a single 
currency, the Euro. 
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Chapter I was a short introduction, laying the premIse for which I would 
elaborate on throughout the rest of the chapters. I posed two questions and stated my 
hypothesis for which the project and the results would be based around. I guided the 
reader through the various sections of each chapter and provided a brief description of 
each section. Chapter 2 proceeded into the underlying history behind the euro and traced 
the most important events and occurrences that led up to the introduction of the Euro. I 
began with "The Early Years" dating back to the end of the 60's beginning of the 70's 
and progressed into the later 70's with the creation of the European Monetary System. A 
" 
section discussing The SIngle European Act 0 f I 986 a nd a section 0 n The Maastricht 
Treaty are also included'fn Chapter 2, as these are two of the most crucial documents in 
the history of economic and monetary integration as well a s the creation 0 fthe E uro. 
Chapter 2 concluded with "The Euro Launch," which highlighted the occurrences right 
around the time of the introduction of the Euro, and "Further Integration in Europe" 
which included current trends with the Euro as well as some statements made about the 
Euro from members of the European Central Bank, which is the closest working 
government body to the new currency. Also included in Chapter 2 is a "Chronology of 
the Euro" and a "Chronology of European Organizations and Member Nations" and a 
"Chronology of Treaties and Reports." 
Proceeding forth, Chapter 3 discussed the overall concept and theory behind 
Economic Integration. In this chapter, I attempted to discuss and explain on a very broad 
level with respect to Economic integration and began to relate it to the economic situation 
of Europe and the creation of the Euro. Next I proceeded to the theory behind common 
currency, in Section 3.2, and related common currency to the previous section on 
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economic integration and then integrated the relation between a common currency, 
Europe, and the Euro. In the final section I discussed Financial Market Integration, 
beginning in a general sense and then relating it back to a common currency and general 
economic integration, Europe and the Euro. In essence, all sections in this chapter are 
very intertwined and build upon each other. 
Chapter 4 completely illustrated the empirical analysis completed with respect to 
the stock, bond, and interest rate markets. Chapter 4 began with the Methodology, which 
included the data extraction and pre-analysis completed such as variances, variances 
ratios, and p-values, all which were critical to ultimately proceed to linear regression. 
Section·4.3 Data, explaited what is included in each table of analysis, and Section 4.4 
Results, is the interpretation of the analysis. I included some interesting figures and 
percentages in regards to Euro and non-Euro countries to more clearly illustrate my 
conclusions. In Section 4.5, Conclusions, I reposed my questions and provided a 
summary of the overall results and my conclusions. 
In general, the results and conclusions concerning volatility did not correlate with 
the p reposed hypothesis. T here are many possible reasons to account for t his lack 0 f 
streng relationship between volatility within the stock, bond, and short term interest rate 
markets and Euro and non-Euro countries. One reason is simply the time period was too 
short. As I gathered data three years prior to the introduction of the Euro and three years 
after, enough time to most accurately test the association between volatility and 
Euro/non-Euro markets may not have e lapsed. A s the introduction of the Euro was a 
significant event for Europe, such an event may be more long term in nature in regards to 
the overall economic impact created by the introduction of the Euro. Another 
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explanation concerns the benchmarks used in the analysis. Better benchmarks to analyze 
the volatility jumps in Euro and non-Euro countries may have been relative to other 
countries such as those in North America, Asia, and emerging markets, along with the 
Euro 12 and non-Euro 12. This might have provided more accurate results, especially 
since with the introduction of the Euro the markets within Europe have behaved much 
more like those of the United States and other countries that already have existing 
integrated markets. The use of the variance ratios and linear regression tests may also 
have not been the most accurate tests to utilize. The linear regression tests may have 
been too simple in regards'to this type of analysis, since they are good for single jumps in 
volatility assuming that {olatility remained constant before and after, but not for more 
complex situations and variables inherent in these markets. Using models which 
accounted for more dynamics that occur within the stock, bond, and short term interest 
rate markets over time and jUdging for a shift around the time of the introduction of the 
Euro may have been more appropriate in this analysis. 
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TABLE 1- DATA DESCRIPTION 
This table explains the indices and data used for the empirical analysis of the stock market, bond market and Short-Term Interest Rates 
ofEuroland and Non-Euroland countries. Source: DataStream International 
Panel A: Stock Market Indices 
EURO 
Country 
Austria 
Belgium 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
NON-EURO 
Country 
Bulgaria 
Crotia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Isreal 
Name of index 
DS Market 
Brussels All Share- Price Index 
Helsinki- HEX General 
CAC40 
DAX 30 Perforn1ance 
Athens SE General Share 
Ireland SE Overall 
MILAN MIB Storieo General 
Luxembourg SE General 
CBS All Share General 
Portugal PSI General 
Madrid SE General Index 
Name of index 
BSE SOFIX 
Crotia Corbex 
N/A 
Prague PX 50 
Cophenhagen KFX 
Estonia ARIP AEV 
Budapest (BUX) 
Iceland SE ICEX All Share 
Tel Aviv SE General 
Code (Mneomic) 
TOTMKOE 
BRUSID~ . 
HEXINDX " 
FRACAC40 
DAXINDX 
GRAGENL 
ISEQUIT 
ITMHIST 
LUXGENI 
CBGKGEN 
POPSIGN 
MADRID I 
BSSOFIX 
CTCROBE 
N/A 
CZPX50I 
DKKFXIN 
ESARIPA 
BUXINDX 
ICEXALL 
ISTGNRL 
Available Dates 
1/111996-1/112003 
1/111996-1/112003 
11111996-11112003 . 
1/111996-11112003 
11111996-11112003 
111/1996-1/112003 
11111996-11112003 
11111996-11112003 
11411999-11112003 
1/111996-11112003 
111/1996-111/2003 
111/1996-11112003 
10/2012000-11112003 
112/1997-11112003 
N/A 
11111996-11112003 
11111996-11112003 
111/1996-1/112003 
111/1996-11112003 
11111996-11112003 
1/111996-1hI2003 
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Latvia Latvia RICl LVRlClL 1113/1997-11112003 
NOIway N/A N/A N/A 
Romania Romania BET RMBETRL 9/19/1997-11112003 
Slovakia Slovakia SAX 16 SXSAX12 11111996-11112003 
Slovenia Slovenian Exchange Stock SLOESBI 11111996-11112003 
Sweden Stockholemborsen All Share SWSEALI 11111996-11112003 
Switzerland Swiss Market SWISSMI 11111996-111/2003 
UK FTSE 100 FTSEIOO 11111996-11112003 
',.,. .. 
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Panel B: Bond Market Indices 
EURO 
Country Currency Name of index Code (Mneomic) Available Dates 
Austria Local currency MSCI Austria lOY + Total Return Index MBSOEEL 6/30/1997-11112003 
Belgium Local currency MSCI Belgium lOY+ Total Return Index MBSBGEL 11111996-1/112003 
Finland Local currency MSCI Finland lOY+ Total Return Index MBSFNEL 11111996-11112003 
France Local currency MSCI France lOY+ Total Return Index 
''II,.. MBSFREL 11111996-1/112003 
Germany Local currency NIA ,,-. NIA N/A 
Greece Local currency MSCI Greece lOY+ Total Return Index MBSGREL 512911998-11112003 
Ireland Local currency MSCI Ireland lOY+ Total Return Index MBSIREL 1/111996-111/2003 
Italy Local currency MSCI Italy lOY+ Total Return Index MBSITEL 111/1996-11112003 
Luxembourg Local currency NIA NIA N/A 
Netherlands Local currency NIA NIA N/A 
Portugal Local currency MSCI Portugal lOY+ Total Return Index MBSPTEL 4/3011998-11112003 
Spain Local currency MSCI Spain lOY+ Total Return Index MBSESEL 111/1996-1/112003 
Austria US Dollar MSCI Austria lOY + ($) Total Return Index MBSOEE$ 6/3011997-1/112003 
Belgium US Dollar MSCI Belgium lOY+ ($) Total Return Index MBSBGE$ 11111996-1/1/2003 
Finland US Dollar MSCI Finland lOY+ ($) Total Return Index MBSFNE$ 11111996-1/112003 
France US Dollar MSCI France lOY+ ($) Total Return Index MBSFRE$ 111/1996-111/2003 
Gennany US Dollar MSCI Germany lOY+ ($) Total Return Index MBSBDE$ 1/1/1996-1/112003 
Greece US Dollar MSCI Greece lOY+ ($) Total Return Index MBSGRE$ 5129/1998-111/2003 
Ireland US Dollar MSCI Ireland lOY+ ($) Total Return Index MBSIRE$ 1/111996-11112003 
Italy US Dollar MSCI Italy lOY + ($) Total Return Index MBSITE$ 11111996-111/2003 
Luxembourg US Dollar NIA NIA N/A 
Netherlands US Dollar MSCI Netherlands lOY + ($) Total Return Index MBSNLE$ 1/111996-11112003 
Portugal US Dollar MSCI Portugal lOY + ($) Total Return Index MBSPTE$ 4/3011998-11112003 
Spain US Dollar MSCI Spain lOY + ($) Total Return Index MBSESE$ 111/1996-111/2003 
Austria Euro MSCI Austria lOY+ (E) Total Return Index MBSOEEE 6/3011997 -11112003 
I 
Belgium Euro MSCI Belgium lOY+ (E) Total Return Index MBSBGEE 1/111996-111/2003 
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Finland Euro MSCI Finland lOY+ (E) Total Return Index MBSFNEE 1/1/1996-1/1/2003 
France Euro MSCI France 10Y+ (E) Total Return Index MBSFREE 1/1/1996-111/2003 
Germany Euro MSCI Germany lOY+ (E) Total Return Index MBSBDEE 11111996-111/2003 
Greece Euro MSCI Greece lOY+ (E) Total Return Index MBSGREE 5/2911998-111/2003 
Ireland Euro MSCI Ireland lOY + (E) Total Return Index MBSIREE 1/111996-11112003 
Italy Euro MSCI Italy lOY+ (E) Total Return Index MBSITEE 11111996-111/2003 
Luxembourg Euro N/A N/A N/A 
Netherlands Euro MSCI Netherlands lOY+ (E) Total Returnlndex MBSNLEE 111/1996-1/1/2003 
Portugal Euro MSCI Portugal lOY + (E) Total Return Indtx MBSPTEE 4/30/1998-11112003 
Spain Euro MSCI Spain 10Y+ (E) Total Return Index ",~ MBSESEE 1/111996-1/1/2003 
NON-EURO 
Country Currency Name of index Code (Mneomic) AvailabJe Dates 
Czech Republic Local MSCI Czech Republic 10Y+ Total Return Index MSCZCEL 2/28/2001-1/1/2003 
Denmark Local MSCI Denmark 10Y+ Total Return Index MBSDKEL 1/1/1996-1/1/2003 
Hungary Local N/A N/A N/A 
Norway Local N/A N/A N/A 
Poland Local MSCI Poland lOY+ Total Return lndex MBSPOEL 9/30/2002-1/1/2003 
Sweden Local MSCI Sweden lOY + Total Return Index MBSSDEL 1/1/1996-1/1/2003 
Switzerland Local MSCI Switzerland lOY+ Total Return Index MBSSWEL 11111996-1/1/2003 
UK Local MSCI UK Gilts lOY+ Total Return Index MBSUKEL 111/1996-111/2003 
Czech Republic U.S. dollar MSCI Czech Republic lOY + ($) Total Return Index MBSCZE$ 2/28/2001-1/1/2003 
Denmark U.S. dollar MSCI Denmark lOY + ($) Total Return Index MBSDKE$ 111/1996-1/1/2003 
Hungary U.S. dollar MSCI Hungary 10Y+ ($) Total Return Index MBSHNE$ 1131/2001-1/1/2003 
Norway U.S. dollar MSCI Norway lOY + ($) Total Return Index MBSNWE$ 1/1/1996-1/1/2003 
Poland U.S. dollar MSCI Poland lOY +($) Total Return Index MBSPOE$ 9/30/2002-1/1/2003 
Sweden U.S. dollar MSCI Sweden lOY + ($) Total Return Index MBSSEE$ 111/1996-1/1/2003 
Switzerland U.S. dollar MSCI SwitzerlandlOY+ ($) Total Return Index MBSSWE$ 111/1996-1/1/2003 
UK U.S. dollar MSCI UK Gilts lOY + ($) Total Return Index MBSUKE$ 1/1/1996-111/2003 
Czech Republic Euro MSCI Czech Republic lOY + (E) Total Return Index MSCZCEE 2/28/2001-1/1/2003 
• Denmark Euro MSCI Denmark lOY + (E) Total Return Index MBSDKEE 11111996-1/1/2003 
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Hungary Euro MSCI Hungary 10Y+ (E) Total Return Index MBSHNEE 1131/2001-11112003 
Norway Euro MSCI Norway lOY + (E) Total Return Index MBSNWEE 1/111996-11112003 
Poland Euro MSCI Poland lOY + (E) Total Return Index MBSPOEE 9/3012002-111 /2003 
Sweden Euro MSCI Sweden lOY + (E) Total Return Index MBSSEEE 1/111996-1/1/2003 
Switzerland Euro MSCI Switzerland lOY +(E) Total Return Index MBSSWEE 1/111996-11112003 
UK Euro MSCI UK Gilts 10Y+ (E) Total Return Index MBSUKEE 111 /1996-1 /1/2003 
'~ 
" 
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Panel C: Short Term Interest Rates 
EURO 
Country Name of index Code (Mneomic) Available Dates 
Austria Austria VIBOR Overnight Offered Rate ASVIBON 1/1/1996-11112003 
Belgium Belgium Euro-Franc TIN ECBFRST 11111996-11112003 
Finland Finland Interbank WI A Overnight-Middle Rate FINWAON 11111996-11112003 
France France Euro-Franc SIT ECPFRST, 111/1996-11112003 
Germany Germany Euro-Mark SIT ECWGMST 111/1996-1/112003 
Greece N/A N/A N/A 
Ireland Ireland Interbank Overnight Offered Rate EIREDON 1/1/1996-11112003 
Italy Italy Euro-Lira TIN ECITLST 1/111996-11112003 
Luxembourg LUX SE Bonds (Euro) Short Term- Red. Yield LXSTECU 11111996-11112003 
Netherlands Netherland Euro- GLDR TIN ECNLGST 11111996-11112003 
Portugal Portugal MoneyMarket Overnight- Middle Rate PORONRT 1/4/1999-1/112003 
Spain Spain Interbank Overnight Rate ESMIBON 11111996-11112003 
NON-EURO 
Country Name of index 
Bulgaria N/A N/A N/A 
Croatia N/A N/A N/A 
Cyprus N/A N/A N/A 
Czech Republic Czech Republic Interbank OIN- Middle Rate PRIBKON 11111996-11112003 
Denmark Denmark Euro-Krone 1 week (LDN:FT) ECDKN7D 11111996-11112003 
Estonia N/A N/A N/A 
Hungary Hungary Interbank Overnight- Middle Rate HNIBKON 111/1996-11112003 
Iceland N/A N/A N/A 
64 
Israel N/A N/A N/A 
Latvia N/A N/A N/A 
Norway Norway Interbank TIN (Nominal)- Middle Rate NWIBNTN 111/1996-11112003 
Poland Poland Interbank Ovemight- Middle Rate POIBKON 111/1996-11112003 
Romania N/A N/A N/A 
Slovakia Slovak Republic Interbank 1 day- Middle Rate SXIBKID 111/1996-11112003 
Slovenia N/A N/A N/A 
Sweden Sweden Interbank Tomorrow Next - Middle Rate SIBORTN 1/1/1996-1/112003 
Switzerland Switzerland Euro- FRC 1 week (LDN:FT) EC~F7n 111/1996-111/2003 
UK. UK Interbank Ovemight- Middle Rate LDNIBON 11111996-11112003 
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Table 2 Stock Data- Pre/Post Euro Volatility & Variance Ratios 
STOCKS 
EURO COUNTRY Pre-Euro Post-Euro Variance Ratio P-Value Stars 
Std. Deviation # of days Std. Deviation # of days 
Austria 0.0071 783 0.0095 1043 0.56 1.00000 *** 
Belgium 0.0090 783 .0115 1043 1.64 0.00000 *** 
Finland .0154 783 .0281 IG43 3.32 0.00000 *** ."' ... 
France .0130 783 .0166 1043 1.63 0.00000 *** 
Gennany .0142 783 .0184 1043 0.6 1.00000 *** 
Greece .0181 783 .0187 1043 1.07 0.15134 * 
Ireland .0101 783 .0117 1043 1.36 0.00000 *** 
Italy .0143 783 .0126 1043 0.77 0.99995 *** 
Luxembourg N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Netherlands .0131 783 .1058 1043 1.47 0.00000 *** 
Portugal .0111 783 .0105 1043 0.9 0.94444 ** 
Spain .0129 783 .0143 1043 1.23 0.00087 *** 
MEDIAN .0130 783 .0143 1043 1.23 0.00087 *** 
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NON-EURO 
COUNTRY Pre-Euro Post-Euro Variance Ratio P-Value Stars 
Std. Deviation # of days Std. Deviation # of days 
Bulgaria N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Croatia .0238 520 .0186 1043 0.61 l.00000 *** 
Cyprus N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Czech Republic .0110 783 .0134 1043 1.61 0.00000 *** 
Denmark .0105 783 .0127 1M3 "" .... 1.47 0.00000 *** 
Estonia .0285 783 .0117 1043 0.l7 1.00000 *** 
Hungary .0239 783 .0163 1043 0.46 1.00000 *** 
Iceland 0.0051 783 0.0071 1043 1.9 0.00000 *** 
Israel .0128 783 .0118 1043 0.85 0.99169 *** 
Latvia .0203 303 .0125 1043 0.38 1.00000 *** 
Norway N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Romania .0240 334 .0178 1043 0.55 1.00000 *** 
Slovakia .0130 783 .0153 1043 1.39 0.00000 *** 
Slovenia .0162 783 0.0090 1043 0.31 1.00000 *** 
Sweden .0126 783 .0168 1043 1.78 0.00000 *** 
Switzerland .0129 783 .0138 1043 1.15 0.02011 * 
UK 0.0099 783 .0135 1043 1.88 0.00000 *** 
MEDIAN .0129 783 .0137 1043 1.00 0.50590 *** 
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Table 3A-Bond Data- Local/Europe- Pre/Post Euro Volatility & Variance Ratios 
BONDS 
EURO COUNTRY 
LOCAL 
Austria-Local 
Austria 
Belgium- Local 
Belgium 
Finland-Local 
Finland 
France-Local 
France 
Germany-Local 
Germany 
Greece-Local 
Greece 
Ireland-Local 
Ireland 
Italy-Local 
Italy 
Luxembourg-Local 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands-Local 
Netherlands 
Portugal-Local 
Portugal 
Pre-Euro Post-Euro Variance Ratio 
Std. Deviation # of days Std. Deviation # of days 
0.0044 
0.0050 
0.0032 
0.0034 
0.0019 
0.0017 
0.0039 
0.0041 
N/A 
0.0052 
0.0100 
0.0112 
0.0034 
0.0049 
0.0061 
0.0073 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
0.0040 
0.0011 
0.0014 
393 
393 
783 
783 
783 
783 
783 
783 
N/A 
783 
154 
154 
783 
783 
783 
783 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
783 
175 
175 
0.0049 
0.0049 
0.0040 
0.0040 
0.0028 
0.0028 
0.0045 
0.0045 
N/A 
0.0052 
0.0039 
0.0042 
0.0041 
0.0041 
0.0048 
0.0048 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
0.0047 
0.0037 
0.0037 
1043 
10:43 
1043 
1043 
1043 
1043 
1043 
1043 
N/A 
1043 
1043 
1043 
1043 
1043 
1043 
1043 
N/A 
. N/A 
N/A 
1043 
1043 
1043 
"'-
1.26 
1.74 
1.54 
1.39 
2.27 
2.57 
1.35 
1.21 
N/A 
1.03 
0.15 
0.14 
1.48 
0.71 
0.62 
0.43 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
1.43 
12.14 
6.77 
P-Value 
0.00318 
0.00000 
0.00000 
0.00000 
0.00000 
0.00000 
0.00000 
0.00252 
N/A 
0.33805 
1.00000 
1.00000 
0.00000 
1.00000 
1.00000 
1.00000 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
0.00000 
,0.00000 
0.00000 
Stars 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
N/A 
* 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
*** 
*** 
*** 
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Spain-Local 
Spain 
MEDIAN 
0.0045 
0.0049 
0.0042 
783 
783 
783 
0.0041 
0.0041 
0.0041 
1043 
1043 
1043 
~. 
.. 
0.83 
0.71 
1.31 
0.99790 
0.99999 
0.00126 
*** 
*** 
*** 
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Non-Euro Country Pre-Euro Post-Euro Variance Ratio P-Va)ue Stars 
Std. Deviation # of days Std. Deviation # of days 
Czech Republic-Local N/A N/A 0.0054 1043 N/A N/A * 
Czech Republk- Europe N/A 'N/A 0.0068 1043 N/A N/A * 
Denrnark-Local 0.0041 783 0.0041 1043 1.02 0.40887 * 
Denrnark- Europe 0.0042 783 0.0041 ·1043 0.98 0.63923 * 
Hungary-Local N/A N/A N/A ''N/A .... N/A N/A N/A 
Hungary N/A N/A 0.0062 1043 N/A N/A N/A 
Norway-Local N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Norway 0.0029 783 0.0039 1043 1.86 0.00000 *** 
Poland-Local N/A N/A 0.1215 1043 N/A N/A N/A 
Poland N/A N/A 0.0061 1043 N/A N/A N/A 
Sweden-Local 0.0043 783 0.0042 1043 0.96 0.71072 * 
Sweden 0.0070 783 0.0055 1043 0.63 1.00000 *** 
Switzerland-Local 0.0029 783 0.0029 1043 0.97 0.67342 * 
Switzerland 0.0044 783 0.0038 1043 0.75 0.99999 *** 
UK-Local 0.0862 783 0.3010 1043 69.12 0.00000 *** 
UK 0.0065 783 0.0065 1043 0.92 0.90108 *** 
MEDIAN 0.0043 783 0.0055 1043 0.97 0.67342 *** 
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Table 3B~Bond Data- US- Pre/Post Euro Volatility & Variance Ratios 
BONDS 
EURO COUNTRY Pre~Euro Post-Euro Variance Ratio P-Value Stars 
Std. Deviation # of days Std. Deviation # of days 
US 
Austria-US 0.0078 393 0.0088 · ..... 1043, 1.36 0.00016 *** 
Belgium-US 0.0058 783 0.0083 1043 2.06 0.00000 *** 
Finland-US 0.0036 783 0.0067 1043 3.36 0.00000 *** 
France-US 0.0060 783 0.0086 1043 2.03 0.00000 *** 
Germany-US 0.0068 783 0.0091 1043 1.78 0.00000 *** 
Greece-US 0.0012 154 0.0081 1043 0.46 1.00000 *** 
Ireland-US 0.0060 783 0.0083 1043 1.89 0.00000 *** 
Italy-US 0.0078 783 0.0088 1043 1.28 0.00012 *** 
Luxembourg-US N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Netherlands-US 0.0062 783 0.0087 1043 2.01 0.00000 *** 
Portugal-US 0.0022 175 0.0080 1043 13.02 0.00000 *** 
Spain-US 0.0064 783 0.0084 1043 1.72 0.00000 *** 
MEDIAN 0.0060 783 0.0084 1043 1.89 0.00000 *** 
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Non-Euro Country Pre-Euro Post-Euro Variance Ratio P-Value Stars 
Std. Deviation # of days Std. Deviation # of days 
US 
Czech - US 0.0090 1043 
Denmark-US 0.0062 783 0.0083 1043 1.77 0.00000 *** 
Hungary-US N/A N/A 0.0071 ··1043 N/A N/A N/A 
Norway-US 0.0032 783 0.0068 ',,-1 04), .. 4.58 0.00000 *** 
Poland-US N/A N/A 0.0071 1043 N/A N/A N/A 
Sweden-US 0.0074 783 0.0079 1043 1.15 0.02013 *** 
Switzerland-US 0.0070 783 0.0077 1043 1.20 0.00333 *** 
UK-US 0.0065 783 0.0071 1043 1.19 0.00470 *** 
MEDIAN 0.0065 783 0.0074 1043 1.20 0.00333 *** 
72 
Table 4- Short Term Interest Rates- Pre/Post Euro Volatility & Variance Ratios 
Short-Term Interest Rates 
EURO COUNTRY Pre-Euro Post-Euro Variance Ratio P-Value Stars 
Std. Deviation # of days Std. Deviation # of days 
Austria 0.0419 783 0.1414 1043 11.40 0.00000 *** 
Belgium 0.0648 783 0.1781 1043 7.55 0.00000 *** 
Finland 0.7700 783 0.1399 ''" 1042 0.03 1.00000 * 
France 0.2090 783 0.1778 1043 0.72 0.99999 * 
Germany 0.1515 783 0.1778 1043 1.38 0.00000 *** 
Greece N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Ireland 0.0614 783 0.1254 1043 4.17 0.00000 *** 
Italy 0.0255 783 0.0605 1043 1.76 0.00000 *** 
Luxembourg 0.0099 783 0.0132 1043 1.20 0.00000 *** 
Netherlands 0.1217 783 0.1331 1043 1.20 0.00039 *** 
Portugal N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Spain 0.0555 783 0.0537 1043 0.94 0.08420 * 
MEDIAN 0.0631 783 0.1365 1043 1.29 0.00000 *** 
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NON-EURO 
COUNTRY Pre-Euro Post-Euro Variance Ratio P-Value Stars 
Std. Deviation # of days Std. Deviation #ofdays 
Bulgaria N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Croatia N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Cyprus N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Czech Republic 6.4618 783 0.2498 1043 0.00 1.00000 *** 
Denmark 0.2343 783 0.0854 ''''" 1 042 0.13 1.00000 *** 
Hungary 0.8676 783 0.5558 1043 0.41 1.00000 *** 
Iceland N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Israel N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Latvia N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Norway 0.1904 783 0.1976 1043 1.20 0.00351 *** 
Poland 2.3385 783 2.2578 1043 0.93 0.85420 * 
Romania N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Slovakia 4.9719 783 2.1340 1043 0.18 1.00000 *** 
Slovenia N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Sweden 0.0400 783 0.0425 1043 1.13 0.03529 ** 
Switzerland 0.1836 783 0.1301 1043 0.50 1.00000 *** 
UK 1.1119 783 0.5727 1043 0.27 1.00000 *** 
MEDIAN 0.8676 783 0.2498 1043 0.41 1.00000 *** 
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Table 5 
Stock Return Volatility Regression Results 
Intercept 
T-Stat 
EuroDummy 
T-Stat 
Pre-Euro Volatility 
T-Stat 
GDP 
T-Stat 
Inflation 
T-Stat 
Exports/GDP 
,F 
T-Stat 
Imports,/GJ)P 
T --Stat 
R-Squared 
Number of Observations 
MS Residual 
Notes: 
-0.0937 
-1.1792 
0.1590 
1.3272 
0.0711 
25 
0.0884 
"Euro Dummy" equals 1 ifEuro Country 
"Euro Dummy" equals 0 ifNon-Euro Country 
0.4418 
2.8231 
0.0433 
0.4309 
-0.3339 
-3.7422 
0.4327 
25 
0.0565 
0.3458 
2.0255 
-0.0090 
-0.0809 
-0.3123 
-3.2322 
0.0000 
0.3129 
0.0802 
0.0952 
0.0046 
2.0383 
-0.0030 
-1.1635 
0.5417 
25 
0.0558 
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Table 6 
US Dollar-Denominated Bond Return Volatility Regression Results 
Intercept 
T-Stat 
Euro Dummy 
T-Stat 
Pre-Euro Volatility 
T-Stat 
GDP 
T-Stat 
Inflation 
T-Stat 
Exports/GOP 
T-Stat 
Imports/GDP 
T..;~tat 
R-Squared 
Number of Observations 
MS Residual 
Notes: 
0.2245 
2.8300 
0.0484 
OA888 
0.0195 
14 
0.0315 
"Euro Dummy" equals 1 if Euro Country 
"Euro Dummy" equals 0 ifNon-Euro Country 
0.1997 
1.967 
0.0615 
0.5732 
0.0706 
OA173 
0.0348 
14 
0.0338 
0.0021 
0.0091 
0.0978 
0.5723 
0.2918 
1.0356 
-0.0001 
-0.9045 
5.3739 
0.7868 
-0.0017 
-0.5535 
0.0041 
1.0718 
0.3082 . 
14 
0.0381 
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Table 7 
Local Currency Bond Return Volatility Regression Results 
Intercept 
T-Stat 
Euro Dummy 
T-Stat 
Pre-Euro Volatility 
T-Stat 
GDP 
T-Stat 
Inflation 
T-Stat 
Exports/GDP ;' 
T-Stat 
,r 
Imports/GDP 
.,1 T-Stat ., 
R-Squared 
Number of Observations 
MS Residual 
Notes: 
0.1900 
1.3939 
-0.1256 
-0.7372 
0.0231 
25 
0.1673 
"Euro Dummy" equals 1 ifEuro Country 
"Euro Dummy" equals 0 ifNon-Euro Country 
-0.1074 
-0.7989 
0.0353 
0.2475 
0.8037 
3.7630 
004057 
25 
0.1064 
-0.2387 
-0.7965 
0.1732 
0.7863 
1.1883 
3.1283 
-0.0002 
-0.8397 
3.9254 
004296 
-0.0051 
-1.2240 
0.0051 
1.0190 
004546 
25 
0.1193 
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Table 8 
Interest Rate Volatility Regression Results 
Intercept 
T-Stat 
Euro Dummy 
T -Stat 
Pre-Euro Volatility 
T-Stat 
GDP 
T-Stat 
Inflation 
T-Stat 
Exports/GDP ;' 
,,,' 
T -Stat 
Imports/GDP 
,ri 
T-Stat 
, 
R-Squared 
Number of Observations 
MS Residual 
Notes: 
-0.6222 
-2.3300 
0.7622 
2.0710 
0.2015 
19 
0.6415 
"Euro Dummy" equals 1 if Euro Country 
"Euro Dummy" equals 0 ifNon-Euro Country 
-0.0400 
-0.1488 
0.2285 
0.6930 
-0.3193 
-3.3840 
0.5346 
19 
0.3972 
-0.2230 
-0.4578 
0.4114 
1.1100 
-0.3088 
-2.5280 
-0.00005 
-0.1553 
8.8764 
0.9551 
-0.0071 
-1.2570 
0.0013 
0.2079 
0.6312 
19 
0.4198 
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